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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION TO TEACHER RETIREMENT PLANS 
 
 Teacher pensions are fast becoming a key issue in education policy.  Unfunded pension 
liability, large numbers of retiring teachers, and increasing mobility among existing teachers all 
contribute to putting pensions in the spotlight (Hansen, 2008).  Despite the importance of this 
issue, little empirical research has been conducted about teacher retirement systems or the 
retirement preferences of teachers specifically.  The purpose of this dissertation is to present an 
examination of teacher pension preferences and behavior which will provide preliminary insight 
into this topic, inform policy around teacher pensions, and help frame questions for future 
research. 
 
Problems with Teacher Retirement Plans 
 In very broad terms, there seem to be three major problems with the current system of 
defined benefit teacher pensions.  First, teacher pensions may not serve the important dual 
purposes of increasing employee productivity and reducing turnover costs to firms (in this case 
school districts) that pensions were created to serve according to economic theory (outlined in 
Chapter II).  Second, the current system may not be financially sustainable as large numbers of 
teachers retire in the coming years.  Finally, the current pension structure may not be providing 
the necessary incentives to recruit and maintain a high-quality teaching force in the twenty-first 
century. 
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 One of the primary reasons employers offer pensions to their employees is to increase 
productivity (Ippolito, 1997).  The logic here is that if an employee does not perform her job well 
and is fired, she will be entitled to little or no retirement benefit (Ippolito, 1997).  However, 
teacher tenure policies in many districts and states make it extremely difficult to dismiss tenured 
teachers for all but the most serious infractions, such as “incompetence, immorality, 
insubordination, and neglect of duty” (Cambron-McCabe et al., 2004, p. 412).  Indeed, according 
to Coleman et al. (2005), “the interests of teachers have been expanded regarding the rights of 
permanent or tenured teachers to due process thus making it often a frustrating and time 
consuming process to dismiss a teacher (p. 227).”  If teachers’ jobs, and therefore retirement 
benefits, are protected by tenure, the incentive offered by a pension to work hard so as not to be 
fired is eliminated. 
 The second important function of pensions is to reduce costs to the firm generated by 
employee turnover.  In the case of most public school teachers, “the firm” would be the district 
that hires them.  It is at the district level that costs for recruiting, interviewing, and providing in-
service training for teachers are generally incurred (Milanowski & Odden, 2007).  However, 
most teacher pension plans operate at the state level (Hansen, 2008).  There is little reason to 
believe that a teacher switching districts within a state is more cost-effective (and therefore more 
desirable) than a teacher switching states, but the current pension system punishes the latter and 
not the former.  It could be argued that states have an interest in retaining high-quality teachers, 
especially in this era of accountability at the state level spurred by initiatives such as No Child 
Left Behind and Race to the Top.  However, under the current system, pensions are awarded to 
high- and low- quality teachers equally so there is no way for states to differentiate when it 
comes to retention.   
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 In addition to not necessarily accomplishing the theoretical goals behind offering 
employee pensions, the current system of teacher pensions raises serious financial concerns.  On 
a basic level, the funding problems with defined benefit pensions are quite easy to understand.  
Defined benefit plans pay a predetermined amount each year from retirement until death.  The 
current benefit structure in many states encourages teachers to retire much earlier than people in 
other professions; often in their early fifties.  Add to this the fact that people are living longer 
than ever and it is easy to understand how such plans could be in financial trouble.  A traditional 
guideline for teacher retirement has been “the rule of eighty,” making a teacher eligible for 
retirement benefits when her age plus years of teaching add up to eighty (Hansen, 2008).  This 
means that a teacher who entered the profession at twenty-two and teaches for twenty-nine years 
is eligible for retirement at age 51.  If she lives to be eighty, she will collect her pension for as 
long as she taught.  While some states have replaced the rule of eighty with the rule of eighty-
five or the rule of ninety, many others offer full retirement benefits after 30 years of service at 
any age (see Appendix A), again allowing a teacher who started working right out of college to 
retire in her early fifties and possibly collect a pension for thirty years or more. 
While many teachers may be willing and able to stay in the classroom past the point of 
retirement eligibility, they have a financial disincentive in many systems to do so.  As long as a 
teacher continues to teach, she does not receive any pension.  At some point, this will actually 
cause her to lose pension wealth.   Costrell and Podgursky explain in detail how this works in 
Ohio (2007b) and in four other states (2007a), and it is likely that many other states follow 
patterns similar to these.  With these systems in place, teachers have strong incentives to leave 
the profession early, resulting in many additional years of pensions to be funded. 
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In answer to those who wonder why teachers should not be able to retire early with 
generous pensions, Barro and Buck (2010) point out that “education finance is a zero-sum game 
(pg. 3).”  Each dollar spent funding teacher pensions is a dollar that cannot be spent on reducing 
class size, improving school facilities, or other important programs that benefit students directly.  
In Chicago, pension contributions will make up more than 10 percent of the district budget in 
2011 (Barro & Buck, pg. 3).  Other systems face similar (or even worse) situations (Barro & 
Buck, 2010). 
 Given these issues, it makes sense to ask where the funding of teacher pension plans 
currently stands.  As one might expect, the answer again varies by state.  Hansen (2008) found 
that only 8 of 58 state and district had plans funded at 100 percent or more, with an additional 
nine plans funded at 90-99 percent and 26 plans below 80 percent.  Given that a pension system 
funded at 80 percent or higher is considered “healthy” by the GAO (Hansen, 2008), this means 
that more than half of the teacher retirement plans in the United States are in financial trouble.  
Barro and Buck (2010) claim that the funding picture is even bleaker.  They argue that the real 
unfunded state liabilities are much higher than the numbers states report because they do not 
adjust for discount rate or market value when making their calculations.  When they make these 
adjustments, no state’s plan is fully funded and many states are funded well below 50 percent.  
The situation becomes even more problematic when the costs of health care are considered, as 
many teachers retire before they are eligible for MediCare (Costrell and Podgursky, 2007a). 
 Finally, in addition to not serving their theoretical purpose and suffering from serious 
funding issues, teacher pension plans as they currently exist simply may not produce the correct 
incentives that attract and maintain a quality teaching force.  We have already seen one example 
of this- teachers have a financial incentive to retire when they may have many good years left in 
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the classroom.  There is no reason for a dedicated and enthusiastic teacher to be pushed out of 
the profession in her fifties, when she may have a great deal of wisdom and experience to share 
with her colleagues.  In fact, this practice may contribute to teacher shortages (Hansen, 2008).  
On the flip side, because defined benefit plans are heavily back-loaded, they may encourage 
teachers who no longer truly want to teach to remain in the classroom for a few more years in 
order to receive greater retirement benefits.  Since research has shown no impact of teacher 
experience on student achievement after the first 5 years- with some studies claiming as little as 
one year (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Goldhaber & Brewer, 1997; Goldhaber & Brewer, 
2000; Hanushek, 1986; Rockoff, 2004)- it may not make sense to offer such a strong financial 
incentive for senior teachers to stay in the profession.  
 Another problem is the issue of mobility.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
the average person changes jobs 11 times during his or her working life.  While the current 
defined benefit system may be advantageous for teachers who work in one school district or state 
for their entire career, it penalizes those that do not.  If a teacher does not stay in a system for 
long enough to become vested in the retirement plan (sometimes as long as ten years), she will 
receive no retirement benefits at all.  Even if she is vested, her benefits if she leaves will be much 
lower than if she stays.  Using data from the Schools and Staffing Survey and the U.S. Census, 
Costrell & Podgursky (2010) estimate that around one-sixth of all public school teachers move 
states over the course of a 30-year career.  They also show that the cost of such mobility can be 
quite high- up to 74 percent of pension wealth as compared to teachers in similar jobs who do not 
move states, depending on the timing of the move and the parameters of the state pension plans 
in question (Costrell & Podgursky, 2010). 
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While encouraging employee retention is one of the purposes of pensions according to 
economic theory, it is not always a positive in the teaching profession.  Many programs, such as 
Teach for America, encourage talented and motivated people who might not otherwise consider 
teaching to do so for a few years.  These programs have shown positive results (Glazerman et al. 
2006, Miller et al. 1998) and help provide quality teachers for hard-to-staff urban and rural areas.  
In Washington D.C., for example, more than 25 percent of newly hired teachers in 2004 and 
2005 came from Teach for America and the D.C. Teaching Fellows (Rotherham & Sullivan, 
2006).  The current pension system punishes these teachers by not offering them retirement 
benefits if they do not remain in teaching long enough to become vested. 
The current pension system may also contribute to teacher shortages, as those who do not 
plan to spend thirty years in the teaching profession may be discouraged from teaching at all 
(Gustman et al., 1994).  Even if a teacher enters the profession intending to teach long term, 
many career teachers may need to move for personal or family reasons and lose out on their 
pensions.  Finally, defined benefit plans may discourage people from becoming teachers later in 
life, as they would have to teach for a long time in order to qualify for retirement.  In short, 
today’s teaching force is not homogenous, and many teachers lose out under a defined benefit 
plan.  Therefore, according to Gustman et.al., “it has been argued that the increasingly popular 
401(k) plan, a type of defined contribution plan that, within limits, allows the benefit to vary 
among covered workers as the firm matches some portion of the worker's chosen contribution, 
may better meet the needs of today's heterogeneous work force than do more traditional defined 
benefit pension plans, in which benefits are more similar across all workers (423).” 
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Theoretical Framework 
 I propose that in order for pensions to function effectively as policy levers to recruit and 
retain high-quality teachers, three conditions must be met.  First, the incentives imbedded in the 
pension structure must be aligned with the desired retirement behavior.  Second, teachers must 
understand the incentives.  Finally, teachers must value the incentives provided by the pension.  
If any of these conditions is not met, pensions cannot serve as an effective policy lever. It is 
unclear whether any, let alone all, of them are met by the teacher retirement system as it 
currently stands.  This dissertation examines these issues. 
 The first piece that must be in place is the alignment of pension incentives with desired 
retirement behavior.  Currently, defined benefit retirement plans are structured to encourage 
teachers to remain in one system for around thirty years, then leave.  Research (reviewed in 
Chapter II) provides evidence that teachers do respond to these incentives.  Therefore, it is 
important to consider the employment and retirement patterns we would optimally like teachers 
to follow, and the extent to which we want to penalize teachers who deviate from these patterns.  
If different retirement behavior were the desired outcome, pension incentives could theoretically 
be restructured to reflect this.  Real-world legal challenges notwithstanding, the target age or 
years of service for retirement could be raised or lowered, and additional factors (such as 
performance measures) could be added to the equation determining final pension value.  
Alternatively, defined contribution plans, which contain no incentives to remain in the classroom 
until or retire after a certain point, could be substituted, leaving the separation date up to the 
preference of the individual teacher.  The following literature review discusses in detail the 
incentives imbedded in most current teacher retirement systems, and concludes that they seem 
misaligned with the goal of attracting and retaining high-quality teachers.  The analysis of 
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existing and original data in this dissertation provides insight into how pension incentives could 
be realigned to attract and retain teachers in the areas and subjects in which they are most 
needed. 
 Second, in order to act on the incentives provided by their retirement plan, teachers 
must understand them.  This seems obvious enough, but it is not clear that they do.  DeArmond 
& Goldhaber (2009) found that the majority (57%) of teachers in Washington state could 
correctly identify their retirement plan from three choices, but Gustman & Steinmeier (2002) 
found that only half of the respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (a nationally 
representative study of all professions, not just teachers) knew whether they were in a DB or a 
DC plan.  Even if teachers are more knowledgeable about their retirement than the public as a 
whole, just knowing the plan name or type may be of little value.  Rather, teachers need to know 
when the incentives in their retirement plan encourage them to retire.  Chapters III and IV of this 
dissertations examine the extent to which this is the case and contribute to knowledge in this 
area. 
 Finally, teachers need to value the incentives provided by their retirement plan.  In order 
to prefer deferred compensation, workers must value the insurance it provides against future risk 
(Gustman et al, 1994).  This may offer an opportunity to differentiate low-quality teachers from 
high-quality ones, as low-quality teachers may place more value on this insurance due to lack of 
opportunity elsewhere.  Higher-quality teachers may be more confident in their own abilities to 
retain their jobs or to obtain better jobs as they desire, and may value flexibility over insurance.   
This dissertation research does not include any measure of teacher quality, though this is a line of 
inquiry that should certainly be pursued when possible.  Instead, I examine teacher retirement 
preferences and teacher response to incentives with respect to other variables, including subject 
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area, grade level, and key demographic variables, in an attempt to help us understand any 
patterns that exist in the way groups of teachers value their pension incentives. 
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 This chapter introduced the three main problems with existing teacher retirement plans: 
they do not serve the purposes of pensions as outlined by economic theory, they may not be 
financially sustainable, and they may not provide the proper incentives to attract and retain high 
quality teachers in the profession.  It also proposed a theory of how teacher pensions could serve 
as a policy lever to this end.  The next three chapters of this dissertation provide evidence about 
teacher retirement knowledge, behavior, preferences, and response to incentives in the form of a 
review of the literature and original research.  The final chapter ties this knowledge together and 
proposes teacher retirement incentive structures to target specific policy objectives. 
Chapter II of this dissertation first reviews the existing literature on pensions, including 
the function of pensions in the labor market, empirical studies of retirement behavior and trends 
in retirement behavior in general.  It then moves on to a discussion of teacher pension plans 
specifically: their history, the status of teacher pension plans today, and problems with these 
plans, in addition to a summary of previous research on teacher retirement.   
Chapter III draws upon data from the Schools and Staffing Survey and the Teacher 
Follow-Up Survey to examine the choices teachers are actually making when it comes to 
retirement.  Data on each state’s pension system is linked with SASS and TFS data on when 
teachers retire to determine if teachers are responding to the incentives embedded in their 
retirement plan to retire at certain ages and levels of experience.  This data will then be broken 
out according to subject area, school type, and other key variables to investigate which types of 
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teachers are most responsive to these retirement incentives.  This provides valuable information 
on what teachers are actually doing (rather than their plans or preferences), and adds to a small 
but growing body of knowledge about real-world teacher retirement behavior.  
Chapter IV analyzes original data on teacher retirement preferences collected using a 
survey and embedded focus groups.   The survey documents the retirement preferences of 
teachers and future teachers when presented with a set of options.  Three main groups of interest 
are studied: future teachers (students in teacher preparation programs), alternatively certified 
teachers, and traditional public school teachers.  Their retirement preferences are analyzed 
according to group as well as across groups by subject area, grade level, and other demographic 
characteristics.  Learning which teachers prefer which type of pension (and why) can provide 
valuable guidance to policymakers considering retirement reform, especially if preferences of 
teachers in shortage areas such as math, science, and special education differ from those in other 
areas.  If this is the case, pensions may be able to be used as a policy lever to recruit teachers to 
these areas. 
The qualitative portion of this chapter uses focus groups to probe the extent of teacher 
and future teacher knowledge about retirement, and to delve deeper into the reasoning behind 
their retirement preferences.  The same three groups are targeted, with participants in the focus 
groups drawn from the survey sample.  Some research (DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2010) has been 
conducted into whether teachers understand their retirement plans, but more is certainly needed.  
Whether teachers understand their retirement plan’s incentives, and at what point they gain this 
knowledge, is key information for policymakers who would like to use pensions as a recruitment 
or retention tool.  Additionally, these focus groups provide an opportunity to probe in more detail 
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what teachers specifically like and dislike about each type of plan, which will provide further 
information to those considering making changes to teacher pensions. 
Chapter V is a concluding essay, which ties together prior research with the original 
research conducted for this dissertation and discusses how teacher retirement plans could serve 
as a policy lever to attract and retain high-quality teachers.  This is a timely question, as defined 
benefit pension obligations represent a major education expense for states, many of which are 
already struggling economically (Barro & Buck, 2010).  Implementing changes in teacher 
retirement plans could save money or free money to be spent more directly on students (Barro & 
Buck 2010).  However, in addition to simply cutting costs, states that are restructuring their 
retirement system have an opportunity to align teacher retirement incentives with desired 
behavior.  This chapter addresses specific policy objectives and discusses how retirement 
incentives could be structured to help reach them. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 I propose that in order for teacher pensions to be used as policy levers to attract and 
retain high-quality teachers, teachers must understand and value their pension incentives.  These 
two conditions are often difficult to disentangle, because, absent additional information, if we 
observe a teacher choosing not to retire when she is eligible we cannot be sure whether this is 
because she did not understand her retirement incentives or because she did not value them 
highly enough to act upon them.  However, if teachers are retiring as soon as they are eligible, 
this is evidence that they know about their retirement incentives and that they value them highly 
enough to act.  This dissertation uses original survey and focus group data to probe whether and 
when teachers know about the incentives embedded in their retirement plans and how highly 
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they value them, as well as nationally representative data from the Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) and Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS) to examine real-world teacher retirement behavior 
on a larger scale. 
 Findings from SASS and TFS indicate that teachers are highly responsive to existing 
retirement incentives, with 76 percent of teachers who are newly eligible for regular retirement 
choosing to retire.  54 percent of teachers in their first year of eligibility for early retirement took 
that option.  Chi-square tests are used to investigate whether some groups of teachers are more 
responsive to retirement incentives than others, and several statistically significant relationships 
are found.  High school teachers overall, as well as secondary science, foreign language, and 
vocational/technical teachers specifically, were more likely to take regular retirement than we 
would expect, as were teachers that reported using student data regularly and those that had 
leadership roles in their school or district.  Elementary teachers, secondary history teachers, and 
minority teachers were less likely to retire than expected.  In the early retirement sample, high 
school teachers overall, as well as secondary math, foreign language, physical education, and 
vocational/technical teachers were more likely than expected to take early retirement, as were 
teachers who indicated they would leave teaching if they could find a higher-paying job 
elsewhere.  Elementary teachers, secondary arts teachers, and teachers that reported being “very 
satisfied” with their jobs were less likely to take early retirement.   
This paints a mixed picture of the effect of current retirement incentives on attracting and 
retaining high-quality teachers where they are most needed.  Overall, teachers are responsive to 
these incentives, especially those provided by regular retirement.  However, with a few 
exceptions, we do not find that these incentives are retaining the best teachers or those in areas 
with the highest demand.  In fact, where differences in retirement behavior exist there is 
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evidence that these teachers may be more responsive to retirement incentives, and therefore 
choosing to retire earlier, than the overall teaching pool. 
 Additional evidence from SASS and TFS is examined to learn about reasons teachers 
give for retirement, and post-retirement reemployment behavior.  Out of those teachers who left 
the profession between SASS and TFS, 54 percent said they did so “to retire,” as opposed to 
health or family concerns, school staffing action, or other reasons, indicating that retirement 
incentives play a major role in the timing of teacher retirement.  Additionally, 39 percent of 
retired teachers report being reemployed immediately after retiring from teaching, evidence that 
they still want (or need) to work and may have remained in teaching if not for the incentive to 
retire. 
  
 The original data collected through a survey with embedded focus groups addressed 
teacher pension preferences and knowledge.  Three groups of interest were studied: future 
teachers, alternatively certified teachers, and traditionally certified urban public school teachers.  
In the survey, these teachers were asked what type of pension plan they would prefer when given 
a choice between defined benefit, defined contribution, cash balance, or a mix of plans.  Overall 
defined benefit (the current plan in the state in which these teachers were surveyed) was the most 
popular choice, but 71% of teachers surveyed preferred one of the alternatives.  The survey also 
revealed different preferences among the three groups of teachers, with future teachers preferring 
cash balance plans and alternatively certified teachers preferring defined contribution plans.   
Further analysis showed that the math teachers surveyed also prefer defined contribution plans. 
 Focus groups allowed further exploration for the reasons behind these preferences, as 
well as uncovering what the various groups of teachers know about retirement and when they 
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know it.  Not surprisingly, future teachers knew little about teacher retirement plans, and most 
often associated retirement with a defined contribution plan.  Alternatively certified teachers and 
regular public school teachers had more knowledge of the plans they participated in, especially 
those with more teaching experience.  Interestingly, pre-service expressed interest in learning 
more about teacher retirement plans, while new teachers in the classroom said they were too 
busy to give retirement much thought.  This indicates that pre-service may be an ideal time to 
educate teachers on their retirement plans and incentives (provided these plans are in fact aligned 
with desired teacher retirement behavior). 
 In terms of what teachers valued in a retirement plan, three major themes emerged.  
First, geographical mobility was important, with teachers who planned to move states at some 
point in their career (or those who already had) preferring a portable pension plan.  Career plans 
were also an important factor, with teachers who did not plan to spend a whole career in teaching 
again preferring portable plans.  Finally, issues of risk, control, and trust emerged.  This was 
perhaps the most interesting factor, because not all teachers viewed pension risk in the same 
way.  Some did not feel comfortable making their own retirement decisions and preferred to trust 
the state system to act on their behalf, while others expressed a desire to control their own 
money.  Younger teachers, including future teachers, also expressed doubt that state pension 
systems would actually be able to provide the benefits they were promised by the time they reach 
retirement age.   
 The findings presented here suggest interesting directions for further research in the 
emerging field of teacher retirement.  However, due to limitations of the data (missing 
information on how long a teacher has taught in one state in SASS and small sample size of 
survey and focus groups), these findings should be viewed as preliminary.  Further research 
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could explore longitudinal data on teacher retirement as well as more detailed state records.  
Additionally, the survey and embedded focus groups could be administered to a larger sample, 
possibly including other teacher groups of interest such as charter school teachers as well as 
teachers in other states.   Though much work remains to be done in this field, this dissertation 
represents an important step in exploring how teacher retirement systems can serve as policy 
levers to attract and retain high-quality teachers.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the issue of teacher retirement.  As not 
much work exists on teacher retirement specifically, I begin with an overview of pension 
economics, which applies to teachers as well as other professions.  Included in this section is a 
discussion of the key features of various retirement plans, theory about why employers offer 
pensions and why employees want them, and prior research on worker response to pension 
incentives.  I next move on to research on teacher retirement specifically, including a brief 
history of teacher pensions in the United States, a discussion of the features of these plans today, 
and an overview of the small but growing body of research that is specifically focused on teacher 
retirement. 
 
Pension Economics 
Academic interest in teacher pensions specifically is a relatively new phenomenon, so the 
literature on teacher retirement is limited.  However, a body of theoretical and empirical work 
exists documenting the function of pensions for both employers and employees, and employee 
response to retirement incentives in public and private pension plans as well as in the Social 
Security System.  I begin with an overview of pension theory, including outlining the key 
features of the main types of retirement plans. I then summarize key findings from studies in the 
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general pension literature, before moving on to consider teachers specifically. 
 
Types of Pensions 
 There are three main types of retirement plans currently in existence.  Until recently, the 
majority of workers were covered by defined benefit plans, and the majority of public school 
teachers still are (Hansen, 2008).  However, most private sector retirement plans have shifted to 
defined contribution plans, most commonly the 401(k) (Friedberg & Owyang, 2002).  There are 
also hybrid plans, which combine features of both DB and DC plans.  A discussion of the 
features of each type of plan, including vesting, portability, risk, benefit accrual, and payment 
structure is useful in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each plan for employees and 
for firms. 
 
Defined Benefit (DB) Plans 
 Defined benefit plans are what we typically think of when we refer to a “pension.”  In 
these plans, the worker receives a set amount of money (the “defined” benefit) every year from 
retirement until death, according to a formula that is based on age, years of experience, and final 
(or average final) salary (Hansen, 2008).  This formula is sometimes, though not always, subject 
to Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs).  Generally both employers and employees contribute to 
the retirement plan at a set rate, though these contributions do not determine the final benefit the 
employee is entitled to receive. Employees usually do not get to choose how much of their salary 
they contribute to a defined benefit retirement plan (Turner, 2010).  
It may take several (often up to ten) years to become vested in a defined benefit plan, 
meaning that up until vesting, the employee is entitled to no pension.  Defined benefit plans are 
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usually not portable from one employer to another, though some workers (particularly in the 
skilled trades) belong to multi-employer plans that allow pension portability within a set network 
of employers (Turner, 2010).  Teacher defined benefit plans are generally portable within a state, 
but not across state lines (Costrell & Podgursky, 2010).  Exceptions  include large cities that 
have their own retirement systems. 
Most of the risk in a defined benefit pension system is borne by the employer (Friedberg 
& Turner, 2010; Turner, 2010).  Firms bear the risk of increasing life expectancy - the retiree 
receives an annuity every year from retirement until death, so he cannot outlive his savings.  
Firms also bear the investment risk in defined benefit plans.  If the market performs poorly, they 
are still expected to pay retirees the same benefit.  The main risk borne by the worker in a 
defined benefit plan is that of early termination.  If he is laid off, the worker may not be eligible 
for a pension or will receive reduced benefits.  Additionally, the employee still bears the risk that 
the pension system will become insolvent and be unable to make the payments promised. 
 Benefits in a defined benefit pension plan do not accrue smoothly (Costrell & 
Podgursky, 2008, 2009, 2010).  They are heavily backloaded, redistributing pension wealth from 
workers at the beginning of their careers to those at the end of their careers.  The figure below, 
from Costrell & Podgursky (2010) shows an example of this using data from the teacher 
retirement system in Missouri: 
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Figure 1: Net Pension Wealth, MO. Actual DB and Hypothetical Cash Balance  
(Adjusted for Inflation) 
Source: Costrell, R. & Podgursky, M. (2010).  Distribution of benefits In teacher retirement 
systems and their implications for mobility.  Education Finance and Policy, 5(4), pg. 532. 
 
 
 As a result, defined benefit pensions incentivize workers to stay with their employer 
long enough to receive these redistributed benefits.  They also contain incentives for workers to 
leave the firm at a certain age, as the accrual pattern eventually turns negative (as it does in the 
above figure at age 55). 
 
Defined Contribution (DC) Plans 
 Defined contribution plans are retirement savings plans where the employer and 
employee both contribute to an employee’s individual account, which is invested, often 
according to the preferences of the employee.  The employee receives the money from this 
account in a lump sum upon retirement, and may choose to convert it into an annuity.  The most 
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common type of defined contribution in the United States is the 401(k), named after the Internal 
Revenue Code which enabled it (Turner, 2010).  Employees often get to choose how much they 
will contribute to their defined benefit retirement plan within a minimum and maximum range 
(the minimum may be zero). 
 Vesting in defined contribution plans is usually quicker than in defined benefit plans, 
and sometimes immediate.  The median vesting period in a defined contribution plan is zero to 
two years, as compared to five years in a defined benefit plan (Friedberg & Turner, 2010).  
Because defined contribution plans are individual savings accounts, they are portable, traveling 
with the worker from one employer to another.  
 In contrast to defined benefit plans, most of the risk in defined contribution plans is 
borne by the worker (Friedberg & Turner, 2010, Turner, 2010).  If he does not save enough or 
retires too early, he could outlive his savings.  Investment risk is borne by the worker as well.  If 
the market performs poorly, he will have less money in his account and receive less upon 
retirement and/or have to work longer.  Early termination is not a particular risk in defined 
contributions plans, however, because the worker retains his individual account and can continue 
contributing to it when he finds work with a new employer, suffering little to no loss in pension 
benefits. 
 Benefits accrue smoothly in a defined contribution plan.  The figure above from 
Costrell and Podgursky shows a cash balance plan (a type of hybrid described below), but 
pension wealth accrual in a defined contribution plan would take a similar shape.  As long as 
contributions to the plan continue, accrual is positive and steady.  This means that there are no 
incentives in a defined contribution plan for a worker to retire at a particular time.  Instead, a 
worker must decide when he has saved enough to stop working. 
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Hybrid Plans 
 It is clear that there are positive and negative aspects to both defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans for workers and for firms.  This has led to the development of hybrid plans 
that try to capture “the best of both worlds.”  Turner (2010) defines four main types of hybrid 
plans in the United States: cash balance plans, pension equity plans, floor offset plans, and 
multiemployer plans.    
Cash balance plans are quite similar to defined contribution plans in many ways.  Each 
worker has an individual account to which the worker and employer contribute, and the worker 
can see the balance of this account.  However, these are actually “hypothetical” or “notional” 
accounts, because contributions and investment earnings are not actually allocated to individual 
accounts, but are kept in a common trust fund from which retiree benefits are paid.  These plans 
are regulated by the government as defined benefit plans and insured as defined benefit plans 
(Turner, 2010). 
Pension Equity Plans (PEPs) are plans under which an employee accrues a percentage of 
his final average salary for each year employed.  That percentage can remain stable, or it can 
increase over time to introduce an incentive for longer worker tenure (Turner, 2010).  Upon 
retirement, the total percentage accrued is multiplied by the final average salary to determine the 
benefit.  The benefit accrual patterns of PEPs are similar to defined benefit plans.  They are also 
regulated and insured as defined benefit plans (Turner, 2010).  However, they resemble defined 
contribution plans in that each employee has an individual retirement account. 
Floor offset plans combine defined benefit and defined contribution plans in order to 
minimize risk and maximize benefits for employees (Turner, 2010).  The defined benefit plan 
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provides a guaranteed minimum benefit, shielding employees from some of the investment risk.  
The defined contribution plan provides employees the opportunity to gain additional retirement 
income that is subject to risk.  Upon retirement, the defined contribution portion of a floor offset 
plan is also converted into an annuity.   
Multiemployer plans are defined benefit plans, but have some features typically 
associated with defined contribution plans, most notably portability within a network of 
employers.  These plans are found mainly in skilled labor fields, where workers may work for 
one employer for a very short time, perhaps only days or weeks (Turner, 2010).  Employers in a 
given field or geographic area agree to administer their retirement plan together, allowing 
employees to accrue benefits as long as they remain within the network.  Turner (2010) points 
out that advances in technology make these plans increasingly easier to operate for larger and 
larger groups of employers. 
 
The function of pensions in the labor market 
The study of pensions and the incentives they provide is a relatively new one in the field 
of economics, emerging in the 1970s (Clark et al., 2003).  Despite a lack of formal economic 
research, however, it is clear that employers have long understood the incentives pensions could 
provide to influence employee behavior (Clark et al., 2003).  Companies have offered pensions 
to their workers for different reasons at different points in history (Logue, 1979).  Pensions 
began as altruism, a reward for long service on the part of the employee and a sense of 
responsibility for the welfare of employees in old age on the part of the company.  This was the 
rationale behind many of the early civil service pensions, and these pensions were seen as 
voluntary acts by employers, not rights of employees (Logue, 1979).    
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However, in the second half of the twentieth century, thinking about pensions shifted.   
Instead of gifts from the employer for years of faithful service, pensions became deferred pay- 
“an entitlement rather than a gratuity (Blake, 2006 p. 49).”  Employers began using a pension 
plan as a substitute for a portion of wages, returning the full amount only when the employee 
reached the desired retirement age (Ippolito, 1991).  This deferred pay model of pensions 
allowed employers to adjust their pension plans to influence employee behavior, particularly in 
two key areas: length of employee tenure with the firm, and level of effort put forth by 
employees (Blake, 2006).   
The first way pensions can influence employee behavior is to encourage retirement at a 
certain time, regulating the length of employee tenure with the firm (Gustman & Steinmeier, 
1995; Blake, 2006).  By withholding some of an employee’s pay until a desired retirement age, 
pensions provide an incentive for a worker to stay with the firm long enough to collect that 
money.  Most defined contribution plans have a vesting period, before which the employee is 
entitled to no pension upon separation.  One reason for this is to reduce the costs associated with 
employee turnover (Blake, 2006).  When new employees are hired, firms often expend 
significant resources recruiting and training them (Blake, 2006).  Additionally, for the first few 
years of employment, new employees are not expected to be as productive as veterans of the 
firm.  In order to recruit and retain them in these early years, companies pay newer employees 
more than their “marginal product.” To make up for this, they may later pay them less than their 
marginal product but encourage them to stay with the firm by using a pension scheme which will 
pay a significant amount if they stay with the firm until retirement but not if they leave (Blake, 
2006).  Once a worker reaches the retirement age specified by his defined benefit plan, there is 
usually a narrow window within which he can retire without financial penalty because each year 
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he continues to work past the firm’s set retirement age is one year he does not collect a pension 
(Ippolito, 1997).  This encourages workers to retire once they reach the age at which the firm 
determines they are no longer productive (Blake, 2006).  Such plan features trace their origins in 
America back to the Civil War, when military pensions were offered to remove aging officers 
from battle (Clark et al., 2003).   
The function of pensions in regulating the length of employee tenure is the best 
documented function in the empirical pension literature.  Some of the earliest work documented 
the tendency of workers covered by pensions to be less likely to leave their jobs over a given 
period than those without pensions.  Research attempting to explain the relationship between 
pensions and mobility followed.  Mitchell (1982) estimated a probit model to predict the 
likelihood of a worker changing jobs which included measures of wages and fringe benefits 
(including pension, stock options, profit sharing, health insurance, and life insurance) as well as 
demographic characteristics. She found that male workers with pension plans were 10-15 percent 
less likely to quit their jobs than those not covered by pensions, depending on model 
specification (the effect of pensions on quit rate was not significant for female workers in this 
study).   
Allen, Clark, & McDermed (1993) estimated a three-equation model where pension and 
turnover effects are estimate separately to account for worker sorting according to pension 
preferences. They find that, controlling for sorting and for observable characteristics, there is a 
statistically significant difference in turnover between workers with pensions and those without, 
with workers covered by pensions are between six and nine percent less likely to leave their jobs.  
The authors attribute this difference to the large capital losses in pension wealth covered workers 
incur by switching jobs.   
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Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994) studied the response to 
retirement incentives among employees at individual firms, where detailed information about 
retirement plans and employee records were available.  Findings from these analyses illustrated 
the strong incentives provided by employer-provided pension plans for employees to retire at 
certain ages, and the impact of changes in these plans on retirement behavior.  They also found 
that in these firms, the effect of pension incentives on retirement behavior was much stronger 
than that of Social Security.  Findings were similar in analyses of three different firms. 
An important contribution of these studies is the “option value model of retirement” 
presented by Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b).  In this model, workers are assumed to compare 
the value of retiring now to the value of retiring at all possible future ages.  If the maximum 
value of retirement is at a future date, the employee continues to work.  This model is used in 
many other studies of retirement behavior, both for the general population and for teachers 
specifically.  As a group, these studies are quite useful in the level of detail they are able to 
analyze regarding the pension plans of specific firms, and present strong and coherent findings 
on the response of workers to retirement incentives.  However, unlike studies based on Health 
and Retirement Study data, they are not nationally representative. 
Samwick (1998) addresses the issue of detailed vs. nationally representative data by 
creating a unique data set linking household data from the Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
(1983, 1986) with information on their pension plans in the Pension Provider Survey.  The 
Pension Provider Survey attempted to interview the plan provider for every pension identified in 
the SCF, thus providing a valuable source for detailed pension information.  Samwick estimates 
the probability of retirement based on accrual of retirement wealth and other factors.  He also 
includes Stock & Wise’s (1990) option value of retirement measure, and finds that it is a 
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“parsimonious but comprehensive measure of future retirement incentives in this more 
representative sample (pg. 4).”  He also finds that it is the change in retirement wealth, not its 
overall level that predicts retirement, indicating that workers are sensitive to incentives in their 
retirement plans that cause retirement wealth accrual to spike at certain ages or years of service.  
Finally, he points out that pensions, not Social Security, are the major determinants of changes in 
pension wealth.  This may be good news for those attempting to analyze teacher retirement 
incentives, as some teachers are covered by Social Security, while others are not. 
Friedberg and Webb (2005) use data from the first four waves of the HRS to analyze how 
the decline in defined benefit pension coverage influenced retirement behavior.  They first 
estimate a model predicting retirement based on pension wealth, peak pension value, type of 
retirement plan, and demographic and job-related variables.  They find that workers with a 
defined benefit plan retire earlier than those with a defined contribution plan due to incentives 
provided by the peak pension value of defined benefit plans (defined contribution plans have no 
peak value).  They find similar incentives in Social Security.  They then conduct simulations to 
predict retirement for individuals covered by defined benefit plans if they were switched to 
defined contribution plans.  They find that such a switch would cause workers to retire later, and 
cite this as an explanation for rising retirement ages as employers move from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans, as has been the trend in recent years.   
Coile and Gruber (2007) use HRS data to examine the relationship between Social 
Security and retirement behavior, specifically whether the incentives provided by Social Security 
can help explain the decline in labor force participation of older men over the second half of the 
twentieth century.  They estimate three models that predict retirement based on wealth accrual, 
peak value, and option value (using the model developed by Stock and Wise, see below) 
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respectively for both Social Security and private pensions, and report three major findings.  First, 
they find that retirement decisions are responsive to incentives provided by retirement wealth 
accrual and by the level of retirement wealth.  Second, they point out that these incentives are 
stronger when the variables are defined with reference to a worker’s entire future stream of 
benefits rather than the return to a single additional year of work.  Finally, they find that 
retirement decisions are roughly equally responsive to incentives in Social Security and in 
private pensions. 
The second way employers can use pensions to influence employee behavior is to 
encourage better job performance.   This is the case because workers who are fired for 
insufficient job performance before they are vested in a pension plan will not be eligible to 
collect a pension, and those who are fired post-vesting but pre-retirement will collect a smaller 
pension than they would had they stayed with the firm. Gustman et al. point out that “employers 
for whom continuous monitoring of workers' effort is difficult or costly may find it particularly 
useful to induce workers to post this bond (428).”  Certainly this condition applies to teaching, 
where employees are rarely supervised directly and methods of holding teachers accountable for 
their work are the subject of much debate.  The literature on this topic is largely theoretical, 
perhaps due to the difficulty in measuring productivity in many occupations and a lack of 
experimental or quasi-experimental data.    
An offshoot of the idea of pensions improving employee productivity is that the pension 
itself can serve a sorting function.  A pension represents a trade-off on the part of the worker- 
they sacrifice a portion of their current income in order to receive a benefit in the future (Blake, 
2006).  Given this arrangement, not all workers value pensions equally.  Montgomery and Shaw 
(1997) argue that workers who value pensions more highly might include “older workers, those 
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in high marginal tax brackets, those with low rates of time preference, and those who are more 
risk averse. These workers will seek firms offering more pension benefits relative to wages, or 
would be more willing to pay higher compensating differentials for pensions (511).”   Older 
workers may value pensions more because they are closer to collecting them, while younger 
workers may not yet be thinking about, let alone planning for, retirement.  Those in higher tax 
brackets likely prefer pensions because of the tax incentives they provide compared to additional 
salary.  Risk averse workers would prefer defined benefit plans in particular, since most of the 
risk is borne by the employer rather than the employee.  Ippolito (1997) considers the issue of 
internal discount rate as a signal of worker quality.  He argues that “low-discounters attach 
higher value to the long-term consequences of their current performance and are thus more 
productive than high discounters, given any level of monitoring effort by firms (107).”  He 
presents a model that proposes how defined benefit plans might attract workers with lower 
internal discount rates, as well as how defined contribution plans can be utilized to encourage 
“selective quitting” by high discounters.    
Sorting effects are difficult to measure, so it is not clear how they actually play out in the 
choices of workers to seek jobs with pension coverage.  Additionally, the extent that the qualities 
outlined above are present in more desirable workers is unknown, and is likely job-specific.  For 
example, in some fields it might be better to have risk-averse employees who may also be more 
dependable in day-to-day work and likely to stay with the firm for a long time.  In other fields, 
innovation might be key, and risk aversion a negative quality in an employee.  Additionally, it 
may be the case that more desirable workers do not value pensions as highly because they want 
to be free to change jobs if a better opportunity comes along.  If less desirable workers do not 
expect to be offered better opportunities, they might place a higher value on the security their 
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pension provides.  In short, while pensions may serve to sort workers, further research is needed 
to determine exactly how this can be accomplished.  In examining teacher pensions, however, it 
is important to consider how sorting may occur based on the characteristics of defined benefit, 
defined contribution, and hybrid retirement plans, and how this may influence who chooses to 
become a teacher. 
 
General Trends in Retirement Behavior 
Given the differing incentives provided by different types of retirement plans and the 
shift in popularity of these plans over time, I also examined general retirement trends for 
evidence that workers are responsive to their pension incentives.  I would expect to see average 
retirement age fall as more firms offer their workers defined benefit plans (as opposed to no 
retirement at all), and possibly to rise with the shift to defined contribution plans (though this 
may not be the case since defined contribution plans do not provide an incentive to retire at any 
particular age).  There is, in fact, evidence of this pattern.  In the United States, average 
retirement age fell throughout most of the 20th century (Johnson, 2002; Mulvey, 2003; Mermin, 
2007).  In 1870, 84 percent of men over age 65 were still working.  This fell to 46 percent by 
1950 and 16 percent by 1990 (Mermin, 2007).  However, in the 1990s and into the 21st century 
this trend began to reverse, with 34 percent of men between ages 65 and 69 still employed 
(Johnson, 2007).  
Several reasons are cited for this trend.  First is the increase, then the decline, of private 
defined benefit pensions (Johnson, 2002; Mulvey, 2003; Mermin, 2007).  In the mid-20th century 
it was common for employers to offer their employees defined benefit retirement plans, which 
provide an incentive for the employee to retire at an age selected by the company (Mulvey, 2003; 
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Mermin, 2007).   Commonly, this retirement age was set at 55 (Mulvey, 2003).  Over the past 
three decades, however, employers have been increasingly switching to defined contribution 
plans, which have no set retirement age and under which workers can continue to accrue 
retirement wealth at a steady rate at any age (Mermin, 2007).  Since defined contribution plans 
do not penalize later retirement, workers covered by this type of plan work an average of two 
years longer than those covered by defined benefit plans (Friedberg & Webb, 2005). 
Another reason cited for the retirement trends of the last century is Social Security.  The 
introduction of Social Security in 1935 provided retirement benefits for workers over age 65 
(Johnson, 2002; Mulvey, 2003; Mermin, 2007).  However, reforms in the latter part of the 20th 
century made Social Security less generous (Johnson, 2002).  Congress first taxed Social 
Security benefits in 1983, and in 1993 they increased these taxes (Johnson, 2002).  Such changes 
reduced benefits to retirees, creating an incentive for individuals to remain in the workplace 
longer (Johnson, 2002).  Additionally, from its inception in 1935 until changes in 2000, Social 
Security penalized work over the age of 65 with a reduction in benefits.  This penalty was 
reduced in the 1980s and1990s before being removed completely in 2000 (Johnson, 2002).  
Finally, employee health care plans are cited as contributing to retirement trends 
(Johnson, 2002; Mulvey, 2003; Mermin, 2007).  In the 1970s and 1980s, approximately 80 
percent of  “medium to large employers” offered at least partial health insurance coverage for 
retirees (Mulvey, 2003).   At the end of the 20th century, however, employers increasingly began 
cutting or eliminating these health care benefits, providing an incentive for those not covered to 
remain employed until they are eligible for Medicare at age 65 (Mulvey, 2003).  
Overall, it is clear from retirement trends in the last century that workers respond to 
retirement incentives that either encourage or discourage earlier retirement.  For teachers, 
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however, these incentives have not changed much over time.  Most teachers are still covered by 
defined benefit plans and not all teachers participate in Social Security (Hansen, 2008).  While 
this would logically lead to teachers retiring at younger ages relative to the rest of American 
workers, this has not been documented and remains an open question. 
 
Teacher Pensions 
 While the above literature discusses pensions in general as well as worker response to 
pension incentives, there is a limited body of work that addresses teachers specifically.  
Researchers have documented the structure and incentives of teacher retirement plans generally, 
and in specific states, and a few empirical studies provide evidence on teacher responses and 
behavior.  Additionally, understanding the historical development of teacher retirement systems 
over time can help us understand how some of the features of today’s plans came to be in place.   
 
A Historical Perspective on Teacher Pensions 
 An investigation of the origin of teacher pensions in the United States can provide 
useful insight into their current function.  The first pensions in America (as well as the first 
pensions anywhere, dating back to ancient Rome) were military pensions.  In exchange for their 
service, soldiers were offered security for their families if they were killed or injured during 
battle.  These pensions served to motivate soldiers, as well as to retain them in the military.  This 
last function was especially important, as the cost of training military personnel was high, and 
soldiers quitting during battle would have been devastating (Clark, 2003).  Similar logic applied 
to hazardous public service jobs, such as police officers and firefighters (Mitchell & Husted, 
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2001).  Additionally, pensions served to move older employees out of physically demanding 
situations in which they might no longer be able to perform (Mitchell & Husted, 2001).  
 Because teachers are employed by districts or states (as opposed to the military, who are 
employed by the federal government), teacher retirement plans have been local and varied since 
their inception (Clark, 2003).  The first teacher pension systems appeared in large eastern and 
Midwestern cities around the turn of the twentieth century, and statewide plans soon followed.  
By 1916, 33 states had some type of teacher retirement plan (Clark, 2003).  However, these plans 
varied widely between states in terms of eligibility rules, benefits, and funding sources.  Some 
were nothing more than forced savings plans, funded entirely by teacher contributions, while 
others involved large contributions from state and local governments (Clark, 2003).   
One interesting difference in most of these plans compared to those of today, however, 
was the age at which a teacher was eligible for benefits.  Originally, many plans set retirement 
age at 70 (Graebner, 1978).  This is interesting, given that a common criticism of teacher 
retirement today is how early (sometimes in their mid-fifties) teachers are eligible to retire.   
Retirement age began to drop around the same time retirement plans were becoming more 
widespread (Graebner, 1978).  During the industrial revolution, efficiency was paramount and 
older teachers were considered inefficient.   Graebner (1978) quotes teacher advocate Rebecca E. 
Shanley, who testified in support of a proposal to lower the retirement age of Washington D.C. 
teachers to 62 in 1919: “We felt at that age the teacher who had been in the schoolroom with 40 
or 50 children for so many years will have lost much of her efficiency . .. We felt that a teacher- 
a great majority of the teachers in the schoolrooms in the graded schools- at the age of 62 ought 
to be retired for the good of the service (404).” 
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In addition to encouraging those who were no longer “efficient” to leave the profession, 
Graebner (1978) argues that pensions were also intended to draw more men to the teaching 
profession.  It was thought that men would bring stability to the profession of teaching, as many 
women teachers at the time either quit or relocated when they married.  Additionally, as the 
focus of education in America shifted from moral values to scientific preparation for future 
employment, men were perceived to be better suited for the job.  In order to attract men to the 
teaching profession, states and districts had to provide salaries and benefits comparable to what 
men could make elsewhere, and pensions were a major part of this incentive package.     
 
Teacher Pensions Today 
 Given their history, it hardly seems surprising that the specific features of various 
pension plans vary among the fifty states, and even among school districts within states, in 
several ways.  The first is whether teachers participate in Social Security.  Originally, no state 
employees (including teachers) were a part of the Social Security program, but legislation 
changes in the 1950s allowed individual states to participate if they chose (Clark, 2003).  Today, 
teachers in most states do participate in Social Security, but those in 15 states and the District of 
Columbia do not (Hansen, 2008).  To make matters more complicated, some school districts 
within nonparticipating states do participate in Social Security.  
 Another difference among state pension plans is the level at which teachers contribute 
to the plan.  In most states, teachers contribute a percentage of their salaries to their pension.  In 
states without Social Security this percentage is typically higher to make up for the income that 
would otherwise be provided by this program.  Teacher contributions range from three percent in 
Delaware to 13.5 percent in Missouri with most states requiring contributions around six percent 
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(for a complete list of teacher contributions, see Appendix A). However, some states vary the 
employee contribution according to years of service or plan type, and other states (Florida, 
Nevada, and Utah) do not require any employee contribution at all.   
 In addition to teacher contributions, each state contributes a different percentage to its 
employees’ pensions.  Again, these contribution levels vary widely, from 25.6 percent in West 
Virginia to one percent in New Jersey (see Appendix A).  State contributions are often 
recalculated on a yearly basis. The ratio of teacher contribution to employer contribution also 
varies.  In some states, including Oklahoma, Maine, Maryland and Indiana, employers contribute 
significantly more than (sometimes twice as much as) employees.  In other states, such as 
Arizona, Missouri, North Dakota and South Dakota, employer and employee contributions are 
identical, and in many other states they are close to equal.  Finally, in some states, employees 
contribute more than employers.  States following this model include New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Illinois and Oklahoma.  In an added layer of complexity, some districts actually pay the 
“teacher contribution” to the pension plan on behalf of their teachers, so actual teacher 
contributions can vary widely even within states.   
  
Table 1: Summary of Key Features of State Retirement Plans 
Variable                            Mean          SD           Min         Max 
 
Years to Vest                          6.06            2.24         3             12 
Teacher Contribution             6.43%         2.57         0%          13.5% 
Employer Contribution          9.71%         5.33         0%          25.6% 
Years of Service for               25.18          7.86          5             35 
Full Retirement 
Age for Full Retirement         61.63          3.78          50            65 
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 Despite variance across (and within) states, teacher pension plans today are more 
similar than they are different.  The main reason for this is that they are almost all defined benefit 
plans, the final value of which is determined by several factors, years of service and final salary.  
Costrell and Podgursky (2008) represent this in equation form as: 
Annual Benefit = (years of service) x (r) x (final average salary) 
Where r is the “replacement factor,” the percentage of her final salary a teacher receives as her 
pension.   This varies by state (see Appendix A), and some states change the replacement factor 
based on teacher age and/or experience.   Iowa, New Hampshire, and New Jersey use formulas 
based on years of service and final average salary that are similar to the one above but do not 
include a replacement factor.  Additionally, state pension systems often add additional rules 
concerning early retirement or delayed retirement incentives, counting sick days toward 
retirement, and other provisions that make the final formula much more complicated.  Before a 
teacher can receive any pension at all she must become vested in the pension system by working 
for a minimum period of time, which again varies by state, up to as long as ten years (see 
Appendix A for vesting requirements by state).   
 In contrast to defined benefit plans, some states are moving toward defined contribution 
plans, where the employer and employee each contribute a set amount of money to the 
employee’s retirement account, which the employee converts to an annuity upon retirement.  
Colorado, Ohio, South Carolina, and Washington are moving toward a Defined Contribution 
model by offering newly hired (and sometimes veteran) teachers a choice of retirement plans.  
Depending on the state, teachers may choose between the traditional DB plan and a straight DC 
plan and/or a hybrid plan (Ohio offers teachers all three options).  Indiana and Oregon have 
introduced hybrid DB-DC plans for all new teachers.  In Indiana this takes the form of a required 
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three percent contribution by the teacher to a DC account, and in Oregon the six percent teacher 
contribution goes toward the DC portion of the plan and the state contribution funds the DB 
portion.  Finally, in Alaska, school districts have a choice to participate in either a DB or a DC 
plan.     
 
Teacher Pension Preferences 
 Little is known about the actual pension preferences of individual teachers.  It is 
possible to determine, given certain information about an individual teacher, what sort of 
retirement plan would be most beneficial to that individual, but we do not know if teachers are 
aware of this.  In order for a teacher to make an optimal decision (if she in fact has a choice), she 
must understand the different types of plans available- no easy task.  Gustman et al. (1994) point 
out that in order for workers to place a value on their pensions, they must understand and value 
the insurance they provide.  They also indicate that for many workers, this is not the case. 
 Where do teachers obtain information about their pensions?  How often do they access 
this information, and at what point in their careers?  Logically as they approach retirement 
teachers may become more knowledgeable about their pensions, but do pension benefits play a 
role in the jobs for which teachers apply?  How do teachers factor in their pensions when 
considering changing teaching jobs, or changing careers altogether?   
 One possible source of information for many teachers is their union.  According to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, more than half of all elementary, middle, and secondary teachers 
belonged to unions as of 2006, with the National Education Association’s 3.2 million members 
(National Education Association, 2010) and the American Federation of Teachers’ 1.5 million 
members (American Federation of Teachers, 2010) accounting for a majority of that 
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membership.  Given this, it is logical to consider the position of these unions regarding teacher 
pensions.  According to their websites, both the NEA and the AFT are strongly opposed to any 
shift away from traditional defined benefit pensions.  The NEA has written letters to Congress 
opposing several pieces of legislation that would weaken defined benefit plans (National 
Education Association 2004, 2006).  The AFT, in addition to publishing such letters, has an 
entire section on their website devoted to teacher pensions featuring an article entitled “The Top 
10 Disadvantages of Replacing Defined Benefit Plans with Defined Contribution Plans” 
(American Federation of Teachers, 2010).  If teachers are turning to their unions for pension 
information, they are clearly not receiving the whole story.  
 
Studies of Teacher Retirement Behavior 
 Research on teacher retirement is a fairly new field, though the number of studies on the 
topic is growing.  In 2009, Vanderbilt’s National Center on Performance Incentives held a 
conference focused on the issue entitled “Rethinking Teacher Retirement Benefit Systems,” and 
in 2010, Education Finance and Policy put out an issue devoted entirely to teacher retirement 
containing selected papers from this conference.  However, in the introductory paper of this 
issue, Costrell and Podgursky (2010) still characterize the literature on teacher retirement as 
“remarkably slender.”  This literature falls into two main categories: studies of the incentives in 
teacher retirement systems, including simulations, and studies examining various issues 
surrounding teacher retirement using administrative data from a single state. 
 The first group of studies is dominated by the work of Costrell and Podgursky, who first 
documented the “peaks, cliffs, and valleys” in the structure of defined benefit teacher retirement 
plans in 2007.  Their work includes analysis of the teacher retirement plan in Ohio (2007) as well 
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as comparisons of plans in multiple states (2009).  In each of these papers, Costrell & Podgursky 
demonstrate that there is a strong monetary incentive introduced by the defined benefit pension 
structure that encourages teachers to remain in the profession until a certain time (often their 
mid-50s), and then to retire.  They argue that these incentives may cause teachers to “put in their 
time” whether or not they are suited to the profession, as well as push experienced teachers out 
of the classroom when they may have many good years left. 
 Costrell & Podgursky (2010) also document the penalties for mobility inherent in 
defined benefit pension systems.   They show how pension wealth is transferred from early-
career to late-career teachers, and how this penalizes those who switch pension systems 
(generally by moving across state lines) or leave the profession before becoming eligible for full 
retirement benefits.  They use Missouri’s teacher retirement system to estimate the pension 
wealth lost by a teacher who moves states mid-career (54 percent in their example), and then 
compare these figures to the pension systems in five other states (up to 74 percent).  They 
conclude that defined benefit pension systems impose large costs on mobile teachers, which may 
impede the efficient allocation of teachers to states where they are most needed. 
 While these studies provide a great deal of insight into the dramatic incentives faced by 
teachers to retire at certain points in their career, they do not document the extent to which 
teachers respond to these incentives.  Teachers may not have complete or accurate information 
about their retirement, or they may be more influenced by nonmonetary factors than by pension 
wealth and choose to ignore the incentives provided by their plan.  Studies (including work by 
both Costrell and Podgursky) are beginning to investigate this issue by utilizing state 
administrative data.  
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 Ni, Podgursky, & Ehlert (2009) conduct such a study using data from Missouri.  They 
show how Missouri’s retirement system grew more generous in the 1990s due to rule changes 
inspired by a booming stock market, introducing such features as “25 and out” (eligibility for 
reduced benefits at any age after 25 years of service) in 1995 and a “rule of 80” (eligibility for 
retirement when age plus years of service equals 90) in 1999.  They document the spikes in 
teacher retirement ages in Missouri, showing that most teachers retire at 30 years of service, 
when they are eligible for full benefits, which results in a median retirement age of 56.  They 
also calculated the year when teacher retirement benefits are maximized using data from the 
Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education and the Missouri Public School 
Retirement System.  They find that most Missouri teachers retire at or near this point, which is 
earlier for many teachers than it would have been under the pension plan’s rules before 1992 
when the changes took effect.  They conclude that this results in Missouri teachers retiring earlier 
overall, and may contribute to teacher shortages in the state. 
 Costrell & McGee (2009) focus on teacher retirement in Arkansas.  They discuss the 
structure and incentives of the Arkansas plan, and include empirical evidence of teachers’ 
retirement behavior in the state.  As in most states, Arkansas teachers participate in a defined 
benefit plan, and the authors document the incentives of this plan to remain in the classroom for 
a certain number of years and then to retire.  In Arkansas, the plan provides a strong incentive to 
retire after 28 years of service.  They then utilize data from the Arkansas Teacher Retirement 
System and the Arkansas Department of Education to document spikes in teacher retirement, 
which they find at 30 years of service prior to 1997 and at 28 years of service after 1997 when 
rule changes allowed full retirement benefits two years earlier.  They then estimate the 
probability of teacher retirement based on accrual of pension wealth as well as other factors, and 
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find that pension wealth accrual has a negative effect on retirement, meaning that teachers are 
less likely to retire when pension wealth accrual is positive, but more likely to retire when it 
turns negative.  This was an expected finding, but one that had not been previously documented 
using empirical methods.   
Furgeson, Strauss & Vogt (2006) studied teacher retirement in Pennsylvania in 1997-98 
and 1998-99, years when the state temporarily increased teacher retirement incentives.  In these 
years, the state offered a “thirty and out” feature, allowing teachers to retire with full pension 
benefits after 30 years of service, regardless of age.  This meant that some teachers would be 
eligible for full retirement in 1999, but not in 2000, providing a strong retirement incentive.  The 
authors show a corresponding spike in Pennsylvania teacher retirement.  They go on to estimate 
a model predicting teacher retirement based on both monetary (pension wealth, Social Security 
benefits) and non-monetary (working conditions, demographic variables) factors.  Results of this 
study indicate that teacher retirement is influenced by both monetary and non-monetary factors.  
Current and future pension wealth, as well as Social Security, were statistically significant 
predictors of retirement, as expected.  However, the authors also found that schools with less 
appealing working conditions (lower test scores, higher crime rates) had higher retirement rates, 
indicating that the decision to retire is not explained entirely by monetary factors. 
 Brown (2009) studied teacher retirement behavior in California, exploiting a reform that 
occurred in the California State Teachers’ Retirement System in 1999.  The reform was in the 
opposite direction of those in the previous studies, doubling the incentive to work past age 60 
and providing a bonus for teachers with 30 or more years of service.  Contrary to the findings of 
other studies here, Brown found that teachers’ response to the incentives to remain in the 
classroom was small, and concludes from this that defined benefit programs “do not greatly 
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distort retirement timing, and so the deadweight burden of such programs is minimal (pg. 38).”  
 This is an interesting study because it examines incentives to delay retirement rather 
than to retire sooner.  It may be the case that teachers are willing to respond to the latter type of 
incentive, but not the former. 
The majority of these studies provide strong evidence that teachers do, in fact, respond to 
pension incentives, as we would expect given the findings of similar studies of the general 
worker population.  However, they are limited to individual states, and in most cases focus on a 
single retirement reform initiative.  While we have no reason to believe that teacher retirement 
varies in any systematic way by state, evidence from more states would be helpful, especially 
since teacher retirement plans are generally administered at the state level.  A national study of 
these issues would also be worthwhile, though differences in plans by state complicate analysis.   
 
DeArmond & Goldhaber (2009) conduct a different type of study about the retirement 
knowledge and preferences of teachers in Washington State.  This was the first published paper 
on this topic, and one that I plan to build upon in my research.  In this study, the authors utilize 
data from the 2006 Washington State Teacher Compensation Survey, which includes questions 
about teacher retirement.  Washington teachers are covered by one of three retirement plans (two 
traditional defined benefit plans and one hybrid plan), and DeArmond & Goldhaber found that 
most teachers could correctly identify which plan they belonged to.  They also found that many 
teachers (49 percent) would prefer to invest in a defined contribution plan, if they had an 
additional 10 percent of their pay to invest.  The survey does not ask teachers whether they 
would prefer to change their plan entirely, and it is possible that this question would produce 
quite different results.  Additionally, being able to identify the name of their retirement plan does 
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not necessarily indicate that teachers understood its structure or incentives, but the survey 
utilized in this study did not probe teachers about the details of their retirement plan.  A more 
detailed survey (or a qualitative analysis) would allow analysis of teacher understanding in 
greater depth.   
 
Overall, research on teacher retirement remains an emerging field.  Studies generally 
focus on one state, due to differences in retirement plans between states, and data is limited.  
Thus far, there is evidence that teacher retirement plans in most states contain strong incentives 
for teachers to retire at a certain point (or points) in their careers, and that teachers are generally 
responsive to these incentives.  This dissertation adds to the growing body of work on teacher 
retirement, analyzing existing data from the Schools and Staffing Survey and Teacher Follow-Up 
Survey and presenting findings from original qualitative and quantitative data collection.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
EVIDENCE FROM THE SCHOOLS AND STAFFING SURVEY  
AND TEACHER FOLLOW-UP SURVEY 
 
 
 This chapter investigates the responses of teachers to the incentives presented by 
defined benefit retirement plans.  Costrell and Podgursky (2007, 2008) discuss the “peaks, cliffs, 
and valleys” inherent in these plans, created by the return to an additional year of work at a given 
point in a teacher’s career.  Typically there are two major peaks- one when a teacher is eligible 
for early retirement and one when she is eligible for normal retirement.  Eligibility varies by 
state, but is based on age, years of service, or a combination of these.  Given a teacher’s age, 
years of service, and the provisions of her pension plan, it is possible to calculate when these 
peaks occur for that teacher.  Based on this information, this chapter addresses the following 
research questions: 
1. To what extent do teachers respond to the incentives to retire presented by their pension 
plans?  Does this vary among different groups of teachers? 
 
2. What reasons do teachers give for retiring, and what are they doing after they retire? 
 
 
 
The first question addresses the first two pieces of the theoretical framework proposed in 
Chapter I.  If teachers understand and place a high enough value on the incentives embedded in 
their retirement plans, we would expect them to retire as soon as they are eligible for either early 
or regular retirement.  If they do not understand these incentives, or if they do not value them 
highly enough, we would expect them to remain in teaching even after they are eligible to retire.  
While the available data do not provide the information to identify which of these pieces is not in 
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place (whether teachers who stay past retirement age do so because they don’t understand their 
retirement plan or because they don’t place enough value on the incentives offered by the plan), 
looking at the characteristics of teachers who retire as soon as they are eligible compared to those 
who do not can provide some preliminary insight into this issue.   
Examining the reasons those teachers who do retire give for their choice and what they are 
doing after they retire from teaching can provide further information.  For example, a teacher 
who retires and takes another full-time job in education likely retired because of the incentives in 
her pension plan, not because she was burned out or in failing health.  On the other hand, 
teachers who give reasons for retirement that have nothing to do with financial incentives, such 
as health or family issues, may have retired regardless of the structure of their pensions.  While 
this analysis will not fully be able to answer the question of whether teachers understand and 
value their retirement plan incentives, it does utilize some of the only nationally representative 
data on teacher retirement to provide as much insight as possible.  This may be a starting point 
for the development of other surveys that more directly address the reasons teachers retire. 
 
Data  
 The data for this study are obtained mainly from the Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) and the Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS).  SASS is a nationally representative survey of 
public and private school districts, teachers and principals conducted by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (Cox et al., 2007).  The TFS follows a sample of teachers who were 
surveyed for SASS and either stayed at their current school, changed schools, or left teaching 
completely, including retirees (Cox et al., 2007).  For this study, I use the 2003-2004 SASS and 
the 2004-2005 TFS.  Teacher weights provided in the SASS and TFS datasets were used in the 
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analysis to preserve the nationally representative nature of the data (Cox et al., 2007).  A more 
recent SASS and TFS are available, but more current data on teacher retirement plans are not.  
Further research may involve obtaining updated retirement plan information and replicating this 
study using the 2007-2008 SASS and the 2008-2009 TFS.  
 
Data on teacher pension plans is obtained from the National Education Association’s 
2008 report Characteristics of Large Public Education Pension Plans (National Education 
Association, 2008).  This report contains eligibility requirements for early and regular retirement 
under the pension plan of each state or district.  The report also contains information on changes 
to these plans over time, so it is possible to determine which eligibility rules affect which cohort 
of retirees in the event that more than one retirement plan or set of eligibility rules is on the 
books for a given state (as is often the case). 
 A total of 7429 teachers participated in the 2004-2005 Teacher Follow-Up Survey and 
were classified in one of three ways: leavers, who left the teaching profession (for retirement or 
other reasons); movers, who remained in teaching but switched schools between the SASS and 
the TFS; and stayers, who remained teaching at the same school at which they were surveyed for 
SASS.  For the purposes of this study, movers and stayers are considered because both groups 
are still teaching and not retired. 
Within this study, two groups of interest are identified: teachers who are eligible for 
regular retirement and teachers who are eligible for early retirement.  In each group, teachers 
who chose to retire are compared to those who did not.  Data from the NEA report was used to 
construct variables indicating teachers’ eligibility for early and regular retirement in each plan 
(most at the state level, but some cities operate their own plans).  Using age and years of service 
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information from SASS, teachers were determined to be eligible for early retirement, regular 
retirement, both, or neither.  Only teachers who were eligible for some type of retirement were 
included in the sample for this study.  Denver, CO; Chicago, IL; Boston, MA; St. Paul, MN; 
Duluth, MN; Kansas City, MO; St. Louis, MO; New York, NY; Omaha, NE; and Fairfax, VA 
have separate teacher retirement systems from the state in which they are located.  Using school 
ZIP codes, teachers at schools in these cities were identified and assigned to the city rather than 
the state plan.  SASS and TFS sampled teachers from all 50 states.  However, Ohio and 
Washington were excluded from the sample in this analysis because teachers in these states have 
a choice of retirement plans and data were not available in SASS to determine which plan a 
teacher chose.   St. Paul, MN was excluded for the same reason.   
Several states were excluded from the sample of teachers eligible for early retirement 
because they do not offer this option to their teachers.  Alabama, Kansas, Mississippi, New 
Mexico and Rhode Island are not included in the early retirement sample for this reason, but are 
included in the regular retirement sample.  Florida and Nevada were also dropped from the early 
retirement sample.  In these states, teachers are eligible for early retirement after only one year of 
service, making all the teachers sampled for TFS in these states eligible for early retirement.  
Including all teachers in these states might mask the true relationships between teacher 
characteristics and early retirement behavior, especially since Florida teachers comprised 15% of 
the early retirement sample. 
The retirement eligibility variable was examined in two ways.  First, all teachers who 
were eligible for regular retirement are identified and those who chose to retire are compared to 
those who did not.  Next, the sample is limited to only teachers who became eligible for 
retirement after the 2003-2004 school year, that is, those who were first eligible to retire between 
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the administration of the 2003-2004 SASS and the 2004-2005 TFS.  In this sample, teachers who 
chose to retire are again compared to teachers who did not.  Those who chose to retire as soon as 
they were eligible represent the teachers who are most responsive to retirement incentives.  The 
teachers who did not retire This process was repeated for the early retirement sample, yielding 
four total groups for analysis, the compositions of which appear in Table 2 below  
 
Table 2: Teachers in TFS Eligible for Regular and Early Retirement 
 
 
Eligible for 
Regular 
Retirement  
(n=672) 
Regular 
Retirement 
Year 
(n=143) 
Eligible for 
Early 
Retirement 
(n=408) 
Early 
Retirement 
Year 
(n=177) 
Retired 67.92% 75.52% 50.98% 54.24% 
Did Not Retire 32.08% 24.48% 49.02% 45.76% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
In addition to examining overall retirement trends, determining which teachers are more 
responsive to retirement incentives can provide valuable insight into how these incentives can 
best be used to attract and retain high-quality teachers.  For example, if teachers in shortage areas 
or teachers with certain desirable qualifications are more responsive to retirement incentives, it is 
especially important to make sure that the incentives are properly aligned with the desired 
retirement behavior.  On the other hand, if teachers do not respond differentially to the current 
incentives, it makes sense to pursue alternative retirement options that are better able to target 
teachers with the desired qualities rather than producing the same retirement behavior across the 
board. 
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 Variables of interest are grouped into five categories: school and teaching assignment, 
teacher demographic characteristics, teacher quality, teacher job satisfaction, and financial and 
political factors.  The first group of variables includes the region (Northeast, Midwest, South, or 
West), urbanicity (urban, suburban, or rural), and school type (elementary, middle, or high 
school) of the school where each teacher was (or still is) employed.  Also included in this group 
is the main subject area taught.  These variables allow us to examine whether teachers in harder 
to staff subjects or locations respond differently to retirement incentives.   
The second group of variables includes teacher demographic characteristics: gender, 
marital status, and race.  Because there are so few teachers in many of the reported racial groups, 
race is examined as a binary variable, with minority teachers (Hispanic, African American, 
Asian, and other minorities) in one group compared to Caucasian teachers.     
 A key factor in whether a teacher chooses to retire as soon as possible may well be the 
extent to which she enjoys her job.  Therefore, a number of indicators of teacher job satisfaction 
are examined.  Both positive and negative indicators are included.  The positive indicators are 
whether a teacher indicated she is “very satisfied” with her job (the highest category out of five 
on the SASS questionnaire) and whether she agrees with the statement “in this school, staff 
members are recognized for a job well done.”  Negative indicators are whether teachers agree 
with the statements “if I could get a higher paying job I’d leave teaching as soon as possible” and 
“I don’t seem to have as much enthusiasm now as when I began teaching.”  These indicators are 
especially interesting, as we might hope that teachers will retire if they are no longer enthusiastic 
about the job or if they are only teaching because they do not have a better option. 
 The next group of variables is comprised of observable teacher characteristics.  Because 
teacher value-added measures or other such data are not available to be linked to teachers in 
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SASS, variables are selected to correspond to characteristics and credentials that principals might 
value in their teachers or with the requirements of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
of 2002 (No Child Left Behind) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(Race to the Top).  Variables in this group include measures of teacher education: whether the 
teacher holds an advanced degree (any degree beyond a bachelor’s), the number of teacher 
education courses taken (a binary variable, with those teachers who had 10 or more courses- the 
highest category documented in SASS- compared to those with fewer), hours spent on 
professional development in the last year (those with 33 hours or more, again the highest 
category, compared to those with fewer), and National Board Certification.  Variables are also 
included for teaching practices: use of student test data in planning and teaching (teachers who 
reported that they “often” use test data compared to those that did not), collaboration with other 
teachers (those who indicated they “participate regularly in scheduled collaboration with other 
teachers on issues of instruction”), and teacher leadership roles (teachers who indicated they 
served as a department head or curriculum chair, or served on a district-wide committee or task 
force).   
 The final variables are financial and political factors that might influence teacher 
retirement.  The first of these is union membership.  Teachers unions include information about 
retirement on their websites and newsletters (see Chapter II), which may be a valuable source of 
information that non-union teachers do not have.  If teachers in unions are better informed, a 
differential response to retirement incentives among union members and non-union members 
may help explain whether lack of information or not valuing retirement incentives is the bigger 
factor in teachers deciding not to retire when they are eligible.  Whether a teacher is in a 
retirement plan that participates in Social Security may also be important.  If a teacher is eligible 
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for Social Security, her decision to retire may be influenced by the age at which she can collect 
Social Security payments in addition to (or instead of) the age at which she can collect her 
pension.  Currently, retirees are first eligible for Social Security benefits at age 62 with full 
benefits at age 65 (Social Security Administration, 2010), but many teachers are eligible for a 
pension at a younger age.  If teachers who participate in Social Security remain in the classroom 
until they are eligible to receive benefits, we would expect to see these teachers delaying 
retirement past the retirement age of their pension plan.   
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for key variables by retirement eligibility for teachers in the  
   2003-04 TFS sample 
 
 
 
Eligible for 
Regular 
Retirement 
(N=692) 
Eligible for 
Early 
Retirement 
(N=511) 
Regular 
Retirement 
Year 
(N=143) 
Early 
Retirement 
Year 
(N=194) 
      School Location and Teaching Assignment     
  
 
Region 
    
 
Northeast 18.50% 16.44% 18.88% 18.56% 
 
Midwest 17.49% 18.20% 19.58% 13.92% 
 
South 39.31% 41.49% 41.96% 52.58% 
 
West 24.71% 23.87% 19.58% 14.95% 
      
 
Urbanicity 
    
 
Urban 27.02% 29.94% 23.78% 35.57% 
 
Suburban 44.36% 48.73% 43.36% 45.36% 
 
Rural 28.61% 21.33% 32.87% 19.07% 
      
 
School Level 
    
 
Elementary School 33.67% 43.25% 31.47% 34.54% 
 
Middle School 15.61% 17.03% 13.99% 15.98% 
 
High School 43.93% 31.90% 47.55% 41.24% 
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Subject Area 
 
Elementary, all subjects 29.19% 32.88% 29.37% 24.74% 
 
Special Education   9.54% 12.33%   9.09% 10.82% 
 
Math   7.51%   8.81%   4.90%   3.61% 
 
Science   7.23%   5.09% 14.69% 13.92% 
 
History/Social Studies   8.38%   5.68%   0.70%   2.06% 
 
English 12.57% 12.72%   1.40%   5.15% 
 
Foreign Language   2.75%   3.13%   6.99%   4.12% 
 
Physical Education   6.65%   4.50%   6.29%   8.76% 
 
Arts   4.05%   5.09%   4.90%   9.28% 
 
Vocational/Technical   8.96%   7.44%   7.69%   8.25% 
 
Other Subjects   3.18%   2.35% 10.49%   9.28% 
      Teacher Demographics       
 
Male 32.23% 30.72% 39.86% 27.84% 
 
Minority 15.75% 18.59%   7.69% 26.29% 
 
Married 72.25% 74.17% 79.02% 79.90% 
      Teacher Satisfaction         
 
"Very Satisfied" 54.91% 52.05% 54.55% 55.67% 
 
"Teachers Get Recognition" 67.63% 76.91% 66.43% 52.06% 
 
Not As Enthusiastic 44.51% 48.53% 54.55% 77.84% 
 
Would Leave for More Money 27.46% 27.59% 32.17% 30.41% 
      Teacher Characteristics and Practices         
 
Advanced Degree 63.29% 50.10% 56.64% 53.09% 
 
10+ Teacher Education Courses 30.20% 27.59% 27.27% 24.74% 
 
Leadership Role(s) 55.64% 58.71% 58.74% 57.73% 
 
National Board Certification   8.96% 10.18%   6.29% 11.34% 
 
Collaborate Regularly 68.93% 69.86% 67.13% 67.53% 
 
Use Student Data Frequently 50.87% 51.27% 47.55% 45.88% 
 
33+ Hours Prof. Development 41.04% 41.68% 37.76% 48.45% 
      Financial and Political Variables         
 
Union Member 77.02% 78.47% 82.52% 71.65% 
 
Participate in Social Security 82.95% 70.06% 83.22% 71.65% 
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Limitations  
 SASS does not document many years a teacher taught in her current state.  This is 
important since most teacher retirement plans are administered at the state level and teachers 
may not get credit for years of service in other states.  The most relevant teacher experience 
variable in SASS was years teaching in any public school, which was used instead.  However, 
even if state-level data were available, it would not be possible to perfectly determine retirement 
eligibility because some states allow teachers to “buy” years of service if they move from 
another state (Hansen, 2008) and data are not available in SASS to determine if a teacher did 
this.  Being unable to identify years of teaching in the current state will only bias the results of 
this study to the extent that teachers with certain characteristics or in certain teaching 
assignments move across state lines more often than others.  We might have reason to believe 
that this could be the case for mobility overall (for example, an elementary school teacher might 
be more mobile than a high school teacher if there are more elementary schools than high 
schools in her district to choose from or be reassigned to), but no research exists documenting 
interstate mobility of teachers with this level of detail.  However, the possibility that teachers 
may be misidentified as eligible for retirement when they are not actually eligible due  to 
interstate mobility should be taken into account when considering the results of this study, as 
they are limited by the noisiness of this measure.    
 Additionally, because no statistical corrections are made for multiple comparisons, there 
is an increased possibility of Type I error in this analysis.  For this reason, as well as those noted 
above, this analysis should be viewed as a preliminary exploration of relationships between 
teacher characteristics and retirement behavior, and causal inferences about the data should not 
be made.  
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Teacher Response to Retirement Incentives 
 The first part of this study examines differences between the teachers who chose to 
retire and those who did not in each of the groups described above: all teachers who are eligible 
for regular retirement, those who are in their first year of regular retirement eligibility, all 
teachers eligible for early retirement, and teachers in their first year of early retirement 
eligibility.  Chi-square tests are conducted to uncover statistically significant differences between 
teachers that retired when eligible and teachers that did not.  To account for the survey design of 
SASS and TFS, the chi-square statistic is converted to an F statistic in STATA using a second-
order Rao and Scott correction (StataCorp, 2009).  The p value for the corrected F statistic can 
be interpreted in the same way as the p value of a regular chi-square statistic. 
 
Response to Regular Retirement Incentives 
 The first important finding, as shown in Table 2, is that two-thirds (67.92%) of teachers 
who were eligible to retire chose to do so.  Even more interesting, 75% of teachers who were 
newly eligible to retire chose to do so.  This indicates that overall, teachers are responsive to the 
incentives in their retirement plans.  Choosing to retire as soon as they are eligible in particular 
indicates that most of these teachers understand the incentives embedded in their retirement 
plans, at least by the time they retire (the timing of this knowledge is explored in the following 
chapter).  It further shows that they value these incentives enough to act on them.  In order to 
determine if some teachers are more responsive to retirement incentives than others, the data are 
next examined for differences between various groups of teachers.  The results of these chi-
square tests appear in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: Teacher Retirement Behavior by Key Characteristics, Regular Retirement 
 
              ALL ELIGIBLE 
  
        FIRST YEAR ELIGIBLE 
 
Retired* 
Did Not 
Retire* F p 
 
Retired* 
Did Not 
Retire* F p 
School Location and 
Teaching Assignment 
         Region 
         Northeast 0.06 0.11 3.55 0.06 
 
0.21 0.03 2.63 0.11 
Midwest 0.10 0.06 0.78 0.38 
 
0.15 0.07 0.01 0.94 
South 0.22 0.20 0.39 0.53 
 
0.27 0.19 1.91 0.17 
West 0.11 0.13 2.37 0.12 
 
0.05 0.02 0.02 0.89 
          Urbanicity 
         Urban 0.12 0.17 6.19 0.01 
 
0.08 0.15 11.1 0.001 
Suburban 0.30 0.21 2.79 0.31 
 
0.38 0.09 3.74 0.06     
Rural 0.13 0.07 2.59 0.11 
 
0.22 0.08 0.44 0.51 
          School Level 
        Elementary School 0.25 0.25   2.53 0.11 
 
0.33 0.17 0.08 0.77 
Middle School 0.11 0.12   1.28 0.26 
 
0.15 0.10 0.61 0.43 
High School 0.17 0.07 12.22 > 0.001 
 
0.18 0.05 1.95 0.16 
          Subject Area 
        Elementary, all subjects 0.20 0.23 4.35 0.04 
 
0.27 0.17 1.14 0.29 
Special Education 0.03 0.04 0.71 0.40 
 
0.06 0.02 0.22 0.64 
Math 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.69 
 
0.03 0.03 0.53 0.47 
Science 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.94 
 
0.02 0.001 4.26 0.04 
History/Social Studies 0.03 0.05 4.41 0.04 
 
0.03 0.03 0.78 0.38 
English 0.06 0.03 3.41 0.07 
 
0.08 0.02 1.36 0.25 
Foreign Language 0.02 0.002 6.25 0.01 
 
0.01 0.00 0.54 0.47 
Physical Education 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.90 
 
0.05 0.03 0.06 0.80 
Arts 0.02 0.01 2.09 0.15 
 
0.04 0.01 1.01 0.32 
Vocational/Technical 0.05 0.01 29.89 > 0.001 
 
0.09 0.01 5.13 0.03 
Other Subjects 0.02 0.01 1.74 0.19 
 
0.004 0.01 3.01 0.09 
          Teacher Demographics 
         Male 0.16 0.10 1.28 0.26 
 
0.27 0.08 1.08 0.30 
Minority 0.05 0.10 6.84 0.01 
 
0.01 0.03 14.42 > 0.001 
Married 0.4 0.32 0.01 0.92 
 
0.54 0.24 0.03 0.85 
          Teacher Satisfaction 
         "Very Satisfied" 0.30 0.27 1.01 0.31 
 
0.38 0.16 0.12 0.73 
"Teachers Get Recognition" 0.37 0.29 0.4 0.53 
 
0.46 0.16 1.33 0.25 
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Not As Enthusiastic 0.22 0.18 0.02 0.90 
 
0.31 0.2 2.06 0.15 
Would Leave for More 
Money 0.12 0.11 0.27 0.61 
 
0.18 0.07 0.04 0.84 
          Teacher Characteristics 
and Practices 
         Advanced Degree 0.34 0.27 0.06 0.80 
 
0.36 0.18 0.14 0.71 
10+ Teacher Education 
Courses 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.94 
 
0.21 0.10 0.004 0.95 
Leadership Role(s) 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.62 
 
0.35 0.25 4.80 0.03 
National Board Certification 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.81 
 
0.04 0.02 0.001 0.97 
Collaborate Regularly 0.39 0.36 2.57 0.11 
 
0.50 0.28 3.71 0.06 
Use Student Data Frequently 0.27 0.03 6.13 0.01 
 
0.34 0.18 0.22 0.64 
33+ Hours Prof. 
Development 0.23 0.18 0.05 0.83 
 
0.32 0.14 0.04 0.85 
 
Financial/Political 
Characteristics 
         
        Union Member 0.44 0.38 0.63 0.43 
 
0.60 0.24 0.86 0.35 
Participate in Social Security 0.41 0.30 1.64 0.20 
 
0.60 0.25 0.69 0.41 
 
*Weighted proportions of total sample 
 
In the full sample of teachers who were eligible for retirement, school level had a 
significant relationship with retirement, with high school teachers retiring at higher than 
expected rates.  There were also statistically significant differences in some subject areas.  
Elementary and history teachers were less likely to retire, and foreign language and 
vocational/technical teachers were more likely to retire.  Teachers in all other subjects retired as 
expected.  It should be noted, however, that small sample sizes of teachers in individual subject 
areas could cause true differences in retirement rates to fall short of statistical significance.  
Similar analysis using a larger sample may reveal more differences in teacher retirement rates by 
subject area.  
Urbanicity also had a significant relationship with retirement rates, with teachers in urban 
areas less likely to retire.  It is possible that this difference is due to the difficulty identifying a 
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teacher’s years of experience in one retirement system in the SASS data.  Some large urban 
areas, including New York, Chicago, Boston, and Denver, have their own teacher retirement 
systems, and teachers may be more likely to move between the city and state systems than they 
are to move across state lines.  To the extent this is the case, urban teachers may be misidentified 
as eligible for retirement when they are not, which could explain a finding of lower than 
expected retirement rates.  The same problem may also explain the finding that teachers in the 
northeast retire at lower than expected rates.  Since these states are geographically smaller than 
those in other areas of the country, teachers may again be more likely to teach in more than one 
state during their careers, leading to a misidentification of their retirement eligibility.  We cannot 
be sure if misidentification of retirement eligibility contributes to either of these findings, but this 
possibility dictates that they should be viewed with caution.  More precise data on retirement 
eligibility is needed to further explore these issues. 
Among the demographic variables, only minority status had a significant relationship 
with retirement, with minority teachers less likely to retire than nonminority teachers.  To the 
extent that states wish to retain minority teachers to establish a teaching force that more closely 
resembles their student population, this may be seen as a good thing.  However, in this case it is 
important to determine whether this pattern exists because minority teachers do not understand 
their retirement incentives or because they do not value them as highly as nonminority teachers 
do.  If minority teachers are aware that they are losing pension wealth by staying in the 
classroom past regular retirement age but choose to do so anyway, this is not a problem from a 
policy perspective.  However, if they are staying because they are not aware of the incentives in 
their retirement plans, this may indicate a breakdown in communication that should be 
addressed.  It is not possible to determine from the SASS and TFS data which of these factors is 
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at work, or even if the relationship between race and retirement can be explained by something 
else entirely.  More targeted survey data and/or qualitative data is needed to further explore this 
issue. 
 Only one of the teacher characteristics and behaviors had a statistically significant 
relationship with retirement behavior, with teachers who report using student data regularly more 
likely to retire than those that do not.  Since use of student data is a major component of both No 
Child Left Behind and Race to the Top, losing teachers who report using student data frequently 
may not be desirable from a policy perspective.  However, it is possible that retirement plans 
may be restructured to retain these teachers at higher rates. 
 Finally, while it might be expected that indicators of teacher satisfaction would be 
highly correlated with teacher retirement behavior, it is interesting to note that the data does not 
support this assumption.  None of these variables had a statistically significant relationship with 
retirement behavior, nor did union membership or participation in Social Security.  
  
I next examine the subsample of teachers who retired as soon as they were eligible.  The 
teachers who retired in this group may be viewed as being the most responsive to retirement 
incentives, as they acted on them immediately.  A smaller sample size in this group would lead 
us to expect fewer statistically significant findings, which is in fact the case.  Those relationships 
that do exist, however, parallel those in the overall regular retirement sample.  Once again, urban 
teachers are less likely to retire than expected, again possibly explained by the misidentification 
of retirement eligibility as explained above.  Subject area again had a significant relationship 
with retirement behavior, with science teachers and vocational/technical teachers more likely to 
retire as soon as they are eligible.  This is a problem for states facing a shortage of science 
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teachers, and these states may want to consider restructuring retirement incentives to retain these 
teachers.  Minority status was also significant, with minority teachers less likely to retire in their 
first year of eligibility than nonminority teachers.   
Finally, teacher with leadership roles were more likely to retire as soon as they were 
eligible.  This may indicate that states should consider restructuring retirement incentives to keep 
their teacher-leaders in the system.  It may also be the case that teachers with the most leadership 
experience are retiring as soon as possible to pursue more challenging and/or lucrative careers 
elsewhere, in which case career ladder-type programs, as well as restructured retirement 
incentives, may be necessary to retain them.   
 
Response to Early Retirement Incentives 
I next examine early retirement rates.  Table 2 shows that around half (51%) of all 
teachers eligible for early retirement chose to retire, and 54% of teachers in their first year of 
early retirement eligibility chose to retire.  It is important to note that these are the teachers who 
were eligible for early retirement but not regular retirement.  While early retirement rules and 
provisions vary by state (see Appendix A), in those states where early retirement is offered it 
represents a tradeoff: a teacher accepts less overall pension wealth for the opportunity to leave 
the classroom early.  Therefore, the fact that around half of the teachers who were eligible would 
choose to accept a smaller pension rather than continue teaching is an interesting finding in itself.  
More interesting, however, would be uncovering differences between teachers who choose to 
take early retirement and those that do not.  Are burned-out teachers using this opportunity to 
exit the profession, or are the most motivated and capable teachers leaving to pursue 
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opportunities elsewhere? Results of the chi-square tests using the early retirement sample appear 
in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: Teacher Retirement Behavior by Key Characteristics, Early Retirement 
 
            ALL ELIGIBLE 
  
    FIRST YEAR ELIGIBLE 
 
 
Retired* 
Did Not 
Retire* F p 
 
Retired* 
Did Not 
Retire* F p 
School Location and 
Teaching Assignment 
         Region 
         Northeast 0.14 0.12 6.85 0.01 
 
0.10 0.09 1.33 0.25 
Midwest 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.70 
 
0.03 0.09 1.60 0.21 
South 0.11 0.24 1.63 0.20 
 
0.24 0.38 0.03 0.87 
West 0.05 0.13 3.81 0.05 
 
0.03 0.05 0.01 0.91 
          Urbanicity 
         Urban 0.10 0.20 1.23 0.29 
 
0.10 0.22 0.88 0.35 
Suburban 0.21 0.34 0.04 0.85 
 
0.20 0.28 0.08 0.78 
Rural 0.07 0.08 1.13 0.29 
 
0.09 0.10 0.39 0.53 
          School Level 
        Elementary School 0.22 0.39 0.68 0.41 
 
0.20 0.31 0.01 0.93 
Middle School 0.07 0.15 0.99 0.32 
 
0.08 0.18 0.86 0.35 
High School 0.08 0.07 5.67 0.02 
 
0.10 0.11 1.28 0.26 
          Subject Area 
        Elementary, all subjects 0.16 0.30 0.83 0.36 
 
0.08 0.26 4.07 0.05 
Special Education 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.73 
 
0.02 0.06 0.49 0.48 
Math 0.04 0.04 0.48 0.49 
 
0.07 0.02 5.58 0.02 
Science 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.87 
 
0.03 0.10 1.91 0.17 
History/Social Studies 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.76 
 
0.02 0.05 0.48 0.49 
English 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.93 
 
0.04 0.05 0.22 0.64 
Foreign Language 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.69 
 
0.05 0.004 10.53 0.001 
Physical Education 0.02 0.02 0.76 0.38 
 
0.04 0.01 4.25 0.04 
Arts 0.01 0.05 2.21 0.14 
 
0.002 0.04 9.63 0.002 
Vocational/Technical 0.03 0.01 5.11 0.02 
 
0.04 0.01 12.37 >0.001 
Other Subjects 0.004 0.01 0.77 0.38 
 
0.003 0.01 0.25 0.62 
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Teacher Demographics 
         Male 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.63 
 
0.08 0.11 0.01 0.93 
Minority 0.08 0.09 1.17 0.28 
 
0.09 0.20 0.81 0.37 
Married 0.28 0.47 0.06 0.81 
 
0.30 0.53 1.71 0.19 
 
 
 
         Teacher Satisfaction 
         "Very Satisfied" 0.18 0.39 3.84 0.05 
 
0.19 0.34 0.50 0.48 
"Teachers Get Recognition" 0.28 0.62 1.96 0.16 
 
0.29 0.49 0.63 0.43 
Not As Enthusiastic 0.21 0.27 2.59 0.11 
 
0.22 0.24 1.97 0.16 
Would Leave for More 
Money 0.13 0.11 6.40 0.01 
 
0.11 0.08 2.28 0.13 
          Teacher Characteristics 
and Practices 
         Advanced Degree 0.20 0.37 0.79 0.37 
 
0.25 0.27 1.91 0.17 
10+ Teacher Education 
Courses 0.13 0.14 3.79 0.05 
 
0.09 0.10 0.61 0.43 
Leadership Role(s) 0.19 0.38 2.73 0.10 
 
0.20 0.28 0.09 0.76 
National Board Certification 0.05 0.05 1.3 0.26 
 
0.05 0.08 0.03 0.86 
Collaborate Regularly 0.24 0.46 2.18 0.14 
 
0.27 0.46 0.18 0.68 
Use Student Data Frequently 0.18 0.36 2.81 0.09 
 
0.18 0.35 1.09 0.30 
33+ Hours Prof. 
Development 0.17 0.26 0.06 0.81 
 
0.22 0.24 1.72 0.19 
          Financial/Political Characteristics 
      Union Member 0.33 0.51 1.11 0.29 
 
0.30 0.51 0.86 0.35 
Participate in Social Security 0.28 0.65 2.82 0.09 
 
0.33 0.48 0.08 0.78 
 
* Weighted proportions of total sample 
 
 
In the sample of all teachers eligible for retirement, we again see a statistically significant 
relationship between grade level and retirement behavior, with high school teachers more likely 
to take early retirement.  In this sample we also see a continued pattern of vocational/technical 
teachers retiring at higher than expected rates, in early as well as regular retirement.  This is the 
only subject with a statistically significant relationship with early retirement behavior, and it may 
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be the case that these positions are being eliminated due to changing curricula and these teachers 
do not have a choice but to retire.  Region also has a statistically significant relationship with 
early retirement among all teachers eligible, with teachers in the northeast and west retiring at 
lower than expected rates.  It is interesting to note that minority status, strongly related to regular 
retirement behavior, is not statistically significant in either early retirement sample. 
While indicators of teacher satisfaction did not have a statistically significant relationship 
with regular retirement behavior, this is not the case with early retirement.  Among all teachers 
eligible for early retirement, those that indicated they were very satisfied with their jobs were 
less likely to retire, which we would expect.  (We would also expect to see this relationship in 
the regular retirement data, but the fact that we do not may indicate that regular retirement 
incentives are strong enough to “push” even highly satisfied teachers from the classroom while 
early retirement incentives are not.)  Additionally, teachers that said they would leave teaching 
immediately for offered more money elsewhere were more likely to take early retirement, 
perhaps indicating that they did just that.  If this means the smartest, hardest working, and/or 
most highly motivated teachers are taking early retirement, leaving behind teachers who are 
teaching only because of a lack of opportunity to do something else, early retirement incentives 
could be an obstacle to retaining high-quality teachers. 
Finally, teachers with the highest number of teacher education courses retired at higher 
than expected rates.  To the extent that these teachers are better qualified than their colleagues, 
schools may be losing their best teachers prematurely because they are more responsive to the 
incentives in their early retirement plans. 
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In the subsample of teachers in their first year of early retirement eligibility, only subject 
area was significant. Math, foreign language, physical education, and vocational/technical 
teachers were more likely to take early retirement than expected, and elementary and arts 
teachers were less likely to do so.  If teachers in shortage areas (such as math) are more 
responsive to early retirement incentives, these incentives may be exacerbating the shortages.  
However, as with regular retirement incentives, restructuring early retirement plans may 
encourage these teachers to remain in the classroom longer. 
 
Overall, SASS and TFS data shows that teachers are responsive to both regular and early 
retirement incentives.  76% of teachers in their first year of eligibility chose to retire, as 54% of 
teachers in their first year of early retirement eligibility.  This indicates that, overall, teachers 
understand and value the incentives embedded in their retirement plans.  When retirement rates 
are compared among different groups of teachers, some statistically significant relationships 
between teacher characteristics and retirement behavior also emerge.  These differences may be 
useful in restructuring retirement plans to retain high-quality teachers in the areas where they are 
most needed. 
 
Reasons for Retirement and Post-Retirement Employment 
 The second part of this study examines the reasons why teachers chose to retire, and 
whether and where they are working post-retirement.  Understanding why teachers choose to 
retire can help determine whether existing incentives are encouraging retirement at the right 
time.  For example, we may want teachers to retire if they are have lost enthusiasm for teaching 
or are in failing health, but not if they are still effective teachers who happen to have reached a 
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set age or experience level.  For this portion of the chapter, the sample of teachers is all those 
who report being retired from teaching on the TFS (n=625).  Retirement age, reason for leaving 
teaching, and reemployment behavior are all examined to help us understand when and why 
teachers are retiring, and what they are doing next, which in turn can inform policy decisions 
about teacher retirement reform. 
 First I examine teacher retirement ages.  This is the age that the teacher reports in TFS 
that she retired from teaching, rather than an age imputed using the teacher’s current age and 
whether she is still teaching.  The former is more precise because it only includes teachers who 
consider themselves retired rather than those who have temporarily separated from teaching and 
may plan to return.  The mean retirement age in this sample was 58 (SD=4.45), with the youngest 
retiree at age 39 and the oldest at age 75.  This is six years younger than the national average of 
age 64 (Social Security Administration, 2010b).  We see two sharp peaks in the distribution of 
retirement ages, one at 55 and one at 62.  55 is the earliest age for full retirement benefits in 
many states (see Appendix A), and 62 is the age at which retirees are fist eligible to collect 
Social Security benefits.  While the analyses above attempted to determine which groups of 
teachers are more receptive to retirement incentives, a simple examination teacher retirement 
ages shows that overall, teachers do seem to be responsive to the incentives embedded in their 
retirement plans and/or Social Security. 
 
64 
 
 
Figure 2: Retirement Age (Teacher Self-Report) 
 
 The fact that many teachers retire in response to incentives may lead us to wonder if we 
are losing good teachers when they reach an arbitrary age, and whether they would have been 
valuable assets to the profession had they stayed.  While it is not possible to answer this question 
directly, examining why teachers say they left the profession can help illuminate the issue.  I first 
look at the reasons teachers leave, as reported in TFS.  Sixty-two percent of teachers report that 
they left teaching “to retire.”  While the wording of this response could perhaps be clearer and 
more informative, we can at least observe that less than half of the teachers who retired did so for 
specific reasons such as health or dissatisfaction.  Future surveys of retired teachers could better 
isolate the reasons behind the choice to retire by asking follow-up questions such as why a 
teacher chose to retire this year rather than last year or next year. 
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Figure 3: Reasons for Leaving Teaching (n=704) 
  
Of the 625 teachers who reported being retired from the profession, 244 (39 percent) 
reported being reemployed.  Not all respondents indicated their new position, but of the 111 that 
did, 71 reported that they still work in the education field.  Outside the field of education, 
popular second careers included retail, real estate, and consulting.  More precise data is available 
on the sector in which retired teachers are reemployed, since all reemployed teachers responded 
to this question.  It is interesting to note that almost half of the reemployed teachers work for the 
federal, state, or local government, which would include all positions in public education. 
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Figure 4: Teacher Reemployment Sector (n=240) 
 
I next examine the number of hours reemployed teachers were working.  If the majority 
of reemployed teachers are working part time, they may have left teaching in favor of a shorter 
workday, and could possibly be retained in teaching with a more flexible schedule.  The National 
Commission on Teaching and America’s Future advocates such plans as a way to retain valuable 
experience in schools while allowing senior teachers to work less than full time (Foster, 2010).  
If, on the other hand, most reemployed teachers are working full time, they might still be 
teaching if not for retirement incentives that encouraged them to leave when they did.  In fact, 
Figure 9 shows that the largest group of reemployed teachers (39 percent) is still working full 
time, with another 29 percent working half time or more.  These teachers may have retired in 
response to the incentives in their pension plans rather than because they no longer wish to work, 
and might be retained in teaching if retirement incentives were restructured. 
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Figure 5: Teacher Reemployment Hours (n=243) 
 
 Finally, I look at how long reemployed teachers plan to stay in their new jobs.  Almost 
half of the reemployed teachers (46 percent) reported that they intended to stay in their new job 
as long as they were able.  An additional 27 percent were undecided, with no specific plans as to 
when to leave their new job.  The remainder planned to stay at their new job until they were 
eligible for retirement benefits (either from teaching or the new job) or Social Security, or until 
they reached some other life milestone (such as a spouse’s retirement or child’s graduation).  
Again, this provides evidence that many reemployed teachers still intend to work for a long time 
and might have been assets to the profession were they retained in teaching. 
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Figure 6: How Long Reemployed Teachers Plan to Stay in New Jobs (n=244) 
 
Overall the information on teacher retirement and reemployment in SASS hints at some 
interesting possibilities but does not allow us to draw firm conclusions.  We can observe that in 
this sample, teachers retire earlier than the overall population, and that more than one-third (39 
percent) take full- or part-time jobs post retirement.  We can also see that many of these are 
government jobs, possibly in education.  This indicates that some teachers may be retiring when 
they are still interested in working, possibly even in education.  If retirement incentives are 
motivating these teachers to leave when they could still be an asset to the profession, we should 
examine restructuring these incentives.  We cannot be sure of the extent to which this is the case, 
however, without further research that specifically and directly investigates whether teachers 
would have remained in the profession if not for the incentives of their retirement plan, and 
whether these are teachers we would want to retain or those that are better off elsewhere. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter examined 2003-2004 Schools and Staffing Survey and Teacher Follow-Up 
Survey data for patterns in teacher retirement behavior.  The first part linked teacher data with 
information on state and city retirement plan eligibility to identify teachers who were eligible for 
retirement, then compared teachers who retired when eligible with those who did not across a 
variety of characteristics.  The second part focused on the reasons teachers retired and their 
reemployment patterns.  These analyses combine to provide preliminary insight into teacher 
response to existing retirement incentives. 
 I proposed in Chapter I that in order for retirement incentives to function as policy 
levers to attract and retain high-quality teachers that three conditions must be met: teachers must 
understand the incentives, teachers must value the incentives, and the incentives must be aligned 
with then desired retirement behavior.  I now turn to the evidence this chapter provides on the 
extent to which these conditions are currently in place.  First, teachers must understand their 
retirement incentives.  SASS provides strong evidence that this is the case for teachers overall, 
with 76 percent of teachers in their first year of eligibility for regular retirement retiring and 54 
percent of teacher in their first year of eligibility for early retirement doing so.  We also see 
spikes in the distribution of retirement ages at age 55 (when teachers in many states are first 
eligible for retirement) and age 62 (when retirees are eligible for Social Security benefits).  When 
teachers understand their retirement benefits is an important question that the SASS data cannot 
answer, but which will be addressed in the next chapter.   
 Whether teachers value retirement incentives cannot, in this dataset, be disentangled 
from whether they understand them, but clearly teachers must understand their benefits in order 
to value them.  It is possible, however, that some teachers understand their benefits but do not 
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value them (or at least do not value them highly enough to change their behavior).  Using this 
data we cannot separate these teachers from those who do not understand their retirement 
benefits, but the original data presented in the next chapter provides some insight into this issue 
as well. 
 The third condition, that pension incentives must be aligned with desired policy 
outcomes, requires us to assume what those outcomes would be.  This is discussed in more detail 
in the final chapter, but for now let us suppose that the desired outcome is to retain teachers until 
they are no longer effective, then encourage them to retire.  There is evidence that early 
retirement incentives may be aligned with this objective since teachers who are satisfied with 
their jobs are less likely to take early retirement and teachers who would rather be doing 
something else are more likely to do so.  On the other hand, data on reemployment show that 
many teachers are taking full-time jobs after retiring from teaching, a possible indication that 
they still have the energy and motivation to be effective in the classroom.  It could be the case 
that some of these teachers simply wanted a change of pace, but many are still employed in the 
field of education.  Another policy objective could be to retain teachers in shortage areas such as 
math, science, and special education, and in urban and rural areas.  The evidence in this chapter 
indicates that teachers in these areas are not being retained under the current retirement incentive 
system at a higher rate than teachers in non-shortage areas, with the exception of teachers in 
urban areas.  In fact, math and science teachers were found to be more responsive to early and 
regular retirement incentives respectively.  However, it is possible to restructure existing 
retirement incentives to target these (or any other) teachers, an idea which is addressed in the 
concluding chapter. 
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 The data in the SASS and the TFS are far from perfect for exploring teacher retirement 
behavior in detail.  However, they do provide a nationally representative sample of teachers and 
some basic information on which to build.  Linking this data with retirement plan data from the 
National Education Association provides further information, allowing us to gain some 
preliminary insight into teacher retirement behavior that we can use to shape policy decisions.  
There is some evidence here that most teachers understand and value their retirement incentives 
(they retire when they are eligible for benefits), but it is possible that these incentives may not be 
aligned with desired teacher retirement behavior.  The next chapter presents original data that is 
used to further explore these issues. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EVIDENCE FROM AN ORIGINAL SURVEY AND EMBEDDED FOCUS GROUPS 
 
This chapter investigates the retirement preferences of teachers and future teachers using 
an online survey and embedded focus groups.  Three groups of interest are identified: future 
teachers (juniors, seniors, and graduate students in teacher education programs), alternatively 
certified teachers (both current participants and alumni of alternative certification programs), and 
traditionally certified urban public school teachers.  
Teacher retirement preferences are an important- and thus far unexplored- issue.  As 
proposed in the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter I, teachers must value the incentives 
provided by their pensions in order for these pensions to function as policy levers.  If the next 
generation of teachers plans to be more mobile, for example, they might express a higher 
preference for the more portable defined contribution plans than older teachers do.   If teachers in 
hard-to-staff fields prefer a certain type of plan, offering this type of pension might be a valuable 
tool to attract teachers to these positions.  If most teachers prefer one type of plan, offering this 
plan might attract more teachers to the profession, allowing administrators to select the best 
teachers from a larger applicant pool and thus possibly increasing teacher quality overall.  
Whatever the pension preferences of pre-service teachers and other key teacher groups, this 
information will be useful to states in determining how to best use retirement benefits as a policy 
lever to attract and retain a high-quality teaching force. 
Also critical are two related issues: what teachers know about their retirement plans, and 
why they prefer one plan over another.  Understanding teacher knowledge about retirement plans 
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is important because teachers can only respond to the incentives offered by their pension plan if 
they are aware of them.  When they are aware of them is also important, because this dictates at 
what point pensions can function as a policy lever.  If teachers are unaware of the structure of the 
pension system when they enter the profession, for example, pensions cannot serve as a 
recruiting tool.  Why teachers prefer one plan over another is also important to understand.  
Long-term career and family plans, attitudes about risk, and many other factors may influence an 
individual’s preference for a DB or DC plan.   By asking teachers to explain their preferences, 
we can gain valuable insight into how retirement plans might be reformed to best meet the needs 
of today’s teachers. 
Specifically, this chapter addresses these issues through the following research questions: 
1. What type of retirement plan would potential teachers and other key teacher groups 
prefer?  Are there differences in the preferences of those teaching or planning to teach in 
different subject areas or grade levels, or according to demographic characteristics? 
 
2. What do teachers know about their retirement plan and teacher retirement plans in 
general, and when and how do they obtain this information? 
 
3. Why do teachers prefer one plan over another?  What features of each plan do they like 
and dislike, and why?   
 
 
The first question is explored using an online survey of teacher retirement preferences, and 
provides the first evidence on what retirement plan teachers would prefer if they could choose 
from three major plan types.  The second question is addressed using focus groups that ask 
teachers, among other questions, what they know about their retirement plan.  DeArmond & 
Goldhaber (1999) find that teachers are fairly knowledgeable about their pension plans, in that a 
majority are correctly able to identify what plan they belong to out of three choices.  However, 
this does not necessarily mean they understand how the plan works.  Focus groups will provide 
insight into the extent teachers are able to explain their retirement plans and understand the 
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incentives contained in these plans.  The third question is also primarily explored using focus 
groups.  A qualitative approach allows us to better understand why teachers prefer one plan over 
another.  This question is presented in the survey, but in a multiple choice format.  Teachers may 
not give a lot of thought to the question, and follow-up questions are not possible.   
Focus groups present the opportunity to delve more deeply into teachers’ knowledge and 
attitudes about retirement plans, as one of the particular strengths of focus groups is their ability 
to help researchers learn how and why people behave in certain ways (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 
1981).  Originally (and currently) used in marketing and private industry, focus groups now form 
the basis of research in a variety of areas including education, sociology, and public health 
(Morgan, 1996).  This study uses focus groups in a way that is quite similar to marketing, as 
participants will be asked to choose from a set of retirement plans and discuss the positive and 
negative aspects of each. 
 
Data 
 Data for this study is collected from three populations of interest.  The first is teacher 
education students, who comprise the majority of future teachers.  Future teachers are an 
important demographic to study because although the current system of teacher pensions may 
not be serving the best interests of all teachers (career changers, those who move between states, 
etc.), it may be impractical to overhaul the system for those already in the profession.  States are 
legally obligated to honor the terms of their current teachers’ contracts, and even if this were not 
the case it would certainly be a bad public relations move and draw fire from teachers’ unions to 
change the rules for those already in the system, especially those nearing retirement age.  In an 
effort to move away from defined benefit plans, some states are now offering only defined 
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contribution or cash balance plans for new teachers and allowing those in the old (DC) system to 
opt in if they choose, while others are implementing hybrid plans with both DB and DC 
components (see Appendix A).   
However, it is likely that the preferences of teachers entering the profession today might 
be different than those of previous generations due to changing employment and career patterns.  
According to a Pew Research Center study (2010), 66 percent of employed 18 to 29 year olds 
(Generation Y, or the “Millennial Generation”) say they are “very likely” or “somewhat likely” 
to switch careers, compared to 55 percent of Generation Xers and 31 percent of Baby Boomers.  
In another survey, Millennials ranked benefits, including retirement, as their second most 
important job consideration after salary (Yahoo! HotJobs& Robert Half International, 2007).  
Given this information, it makes sense that teachers of this generation might prefer defined 
contribution or cash balance plans.  However, this data represents all Millennial workers.  It is 
not clear if this pattern holds in the teaching profession, but this study can provide some 
preliminary insight into this issue. 
The second population of interest is alternatively certified teachers.  As discussed in 
Chapter II, alternatively certified teachers are a growing portion of the teacher labor market, and 
one that might be more mobile than other teachers, both geographically and across careers.  The 
stated goal of some of these programs is to encourage talented individuals who might not 
otherwise consider teaching to spend a few years in the classroom before moving on to another 
career.  Teachers who follow this model may have different retirement preferences than teachers 
who plan to stay in the classroom for many years, favoring plans that are more portable.  
Portability may also be a factor for alternatively certified teachers who plan to stay in the 
classroom longer but move to a different state.  Some alternative certification programs assign 
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teachers to high-need areas all over the country, and teachers in these programs may wish to 
continue teaching beyond their commitment to the program but in a different state than their 
original assignment.  These teachers may prefer plans that are portable across state lines.  
The final population of interest is urban public school teachers.  The retirement 
preferences of those already in the teaching profession will provide context for those of the other 
two groups.  While retirement plans are unlikely to change for teachers already under contract in 
public schools, it will be interesting to see if their preferences differ from those of the two key 
groups outlined above.  I choose to focus on urban public school teachers in particular because 
urban schools have traditionally been harder to staff and experience higher rates of teacher 
turnover (Oakes, 1990; Darling-Hammond & Greene, 1994; Ingersoll, 2001).  Given these 
characteristics, it makes sense for these districts to understand teacher retirement preferences as a 
possible lever for teacher retention.  It also makes sense that if these teachers do not plan to stay 
in their current state or profession for their entire career, they might have different pension 
preferences than teachers that do. 
In order to recruit survey participants, professors of teacher education, principals of urban 
public schools, and administrators of alternative certification programs were contacted to ask for 
permission to survey their students or teachers.  Participants were drawn from two public 
universities, two private universities, three urban public schools, and two alternative certification 
programs, all based in and around a mid-sized southern city.  In order to increase survey 
response rates, surveys were administered in person whenever possible.  When this was not 
possible, administrators provided their students or teachers with a link to the web-based survey 
which participants completed at their convenience.  As expected, response rate varied widely 
according to data collection method.  In the alternatively certified and future teacher groups, the 
77 
 
surveys were largely administered in person and the response rates were close to 90 percent.  In 
the urban public school teacher group, where principals agreed to online rather than in-person 
survey administration, the response rate was around 20 percent.  Table 6 shows the key 
characteristics of the teachers and future teachers who responded to the survey.   
 
Table 6: Key Characteristics of Survey Participants 
Variable            Future Teachers (n=175)      Alt Cert (n=104)     Traditional Public (n=56) 
Mean Experience     0.00        1.83     8.46 
Min. Experience     0.00        1.00     1.00 
Max. Experience     0.00      12.00   36.00 
Percent Elementary*  25.14%      17.31%  35.71% 
Percent Middle School*   25.14%      55.77%         37.50% 
Percent High School*  34.29%      43.27%  48.21% 
Percent Male  36.00%      37.50%  40.00% 
Percent Minority   12.18%      16.35%    5.56% 
Response Rate   86.63%      93.69%  20.74% 
 
*Totals may not equal 100% due to teachers teaching more than one grade level or future teachers being unsure of  
  employment plans. 
 
 
While there is clearly potential for non-response bias in this data due to the low response 
rate in the traditional public teacher group, it may also be the case that those teachers who are 
interested in retirement plans and willing to express their opinions on the subject are those who 
we should be most interested in.  Teachers who choose not to complete a ten-minute survey may 
not be the most vocal supporters or opponents of proposed retirement reforms, and may instead 
be influenced by their more informed and involved colleagues.  Nonetheless, the potential for 
non-response bias should be considered when reviewing the survey results, and future research  
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should focus on obtaining a higher response rate for current teachers, as well as obtaining a 
larger sample overall and examining the retirement preferences of teachers in other states.  
  
Another important factor to consider when interpreting both the survey and focus group 
data is the economic climate in which it was collected.  The survey was administered in the 
2010-2011 school year and the focus groups were conducted in the spring of 2011, in the heart of 
a recession when state budget crises and failing pension systems dominated the news.  This may 
have influenced participants’ opinions of defined benefit pension plans.  However, the stock 
market was also performing poorly, which caused losses in many defined contribution plans.  
Overall, the retirement picture was bleak, whether one was dependent on the government or on 
the stock market.  Whether one of these issues dominated the perceptions of study participants is 
not clear, but it is important to keep the possibility in mind, especially if contradictory results 
emerge in future studies conducted in less troubled economic times.     
 
Survey of Teacher Retirement Preferences 
 In order to determine what type of pension potential teachers would prefer, I utilize the 
Peabody Pension Preference Poll, a web-based survey created by James Guthrie, Michael 
Podgursky, and myself.  The survey consists of two parts: an informational video and a short, 
targeted questionnaire.  The video portion briefly and simply outlines the three main types of 
pension plans (defined benefit, defined contribution, and cash balance).  It is important to note 
that the survey is not intended to measure respondents’ knowledge of their state’s current plan or 
of possible alternatives- this information is presented up front.  Instead, I am attempting to 
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uncover what type of plan these potential teachers would choose if presented with a range of 
options. 
 After the video, survey respondents are taken to a brief questionnaire.  The first 
question in the survey is: 
Suppose that in your retirement plan you contribute 10 percent of your pay and your 
employer also contributes 10 percent. Suppose also that you have a choice among three 
different options for retirement benefits. Both your own and the district's contribution 
will remain at 10 percent regardless of the plan you select. Which would you choose? 
 
After responding to this, respondents are probed about why they chose the plan they did.  They 
are then directed to a series of background questions covering demographic characteristics, 
education, and plans for future employment.  The full survey is available for review at 
http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/site/hH2LxC.   
 
Embedded Focus Groups 
In addition to the survey, embedded focus groups are conducted to investigate teacher 
retirement knowledge and preferences in more detail.  Two sets of questions are used in these 
focus groups- one for current teachers and one for future teachers.  These questions are organized 
into two sections.  The first centers on participants’ knowledge about their retirement plan (or 
teacher retirement in general, in the case of future teachers) and how and when they gained this 
knowledge.  Participants are then shown a short informational video about teacher retirement 
plans (from the Peabody Pension Preference Poll), and answer questions about which type of 
plan they prefer and why (see Appendix B for a complete list of questions).  
 These questions were piloted in one-on-one interviews with public school teachers in 
the spring of 2010, after which two major changes were made.  First, results of these pilot 
interviews suggested that teachers knew very little about the specific features of their retirement 
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plan, and were not aware of any alternatives to their own plan.  Therefore, they were unable to 
comment on what type of plan they might prefer if given a choice.  In order to facilitate 
discussion on this topic, I incorporate the informational video from the Peabody Pension 
Preference Poll into the focus group session.  This video provides participants with some basic 
knowledge upon which to base their opinions and discussion of different types of retirement 
plans.  Additionally, collecting data in focus groups rather than individual interviews stimulated 
discussion among participants, generating responses of greater depth and complexity than those 
obtained in one-on-one interviews.  Participants had the opportunity to hear what others said, 
which may have aided them in expressing their own ideas on the issues presented, whether they 
agree or disagree with others in the group.  It is also the case that this may have produced some 
bias, to the extent that the group was swayed by participants with stronger opinions.  In the 
facilitation of these groups, care was taken to encourage equal participation among all 
participants, but the possibility of bias must still be considered.   
After piloting focus groups of different sizes by conducting mock focus groups with 
volunteers (pilot groups of 3, 5, and 8 were conducted) groups of three to five were found to be 
the ideal size for encouraging discussion, as in smaller groups there were not enough differing 
opinions and ideas to sustain the conversation and in larger groups not all members fully 
participated.  In order to maximize consistency among the groups, as well as to follow up on any 
interesting but unexpected topics of conversation, I conducted all pilot and final focus groups 
myself.  The groups lasted between 45 and 70 minutes, with an average length just under an 
hour. 
 Two focus groups were conducted within each population of interest: future teachers, 
alternatively certified teachers, and traditionally certified urban public school teachers.  These 
81 
 
focus groups are “embedded” in that they are drawn from the sample of teachers who were 
selected to participate in the survey.  Before the survey was administered, teachers were asked if 
they would be willing to do a focus group instead.  Those that volunteered provided their email 
addresses and were contacted to schedule a focus groups session.  In all, 14 future teachers, 10 
alternatively certified teachers, and 11 traditionally certified public school teachers volunteered 
to participate in focus groups.  However, some of these volunteers either did not respond to the 
follow-up email, changed their mind, or did not show up to their scheduled focus group.  Total 
volunteers, participants, and participation rate for each group appear in Table 7 below. 
Focus groups participants were not given the survey with their peers, but completed it 
during the focus group session (so that the information on teacher retirement presented in the 
video portion of the survey would not influence their answers to questions about prior knowledge 
of retirement).  All focus groups were audio recorded, transcribed, examined for major themes, 
and coded around these themes using NVivo software.   
 
Table 7: Key Characteristics of Focus Group Participants 
Variable  Future Teachers (n=8)    Alt Cert Teachers (n=7)   Traditional Public (n=8) 
Mean Experience  0   3.14      10.25 
Min. Experience  0   1     1 
Max. Experience  0   7   34 
Male Participants  4   3     2 
Initial Volunteers  14   10   11 
Participation Rate 57.14%   70.00%   72.73% 
 
 
What Retirement Plan Do Teachers Prefer? 
 The first, and most basic, question addressed in this chapter is simply what retirement 
plan teachers prefer when given a choice among four alternatives: a defined benefit plan, a 
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defined contribution plan, a cash balance plan, or a mix of plans (respondents could choose 
which plans in which proportions they wanted to include in their mix).  As Figure 11 shows, the 
most popular plan was the defined benefit plan, the plan currently offered to most teachers, and 
the one in which the current teachers surveyed participate.  It is interesting to note, however, that 
a majority of teachers surveyed (71 percent) preferred some form of alternative to the defined 
benefit plan. 
 
Figure 7: Retirement Plan Choice, All Teachers (n=336) 
 
 After documenting overall preference, the next step in the analysis was to examine the 
survey data for differences in plan choice according to type of teacher, subject area, grade level, 
and other key characteristics.  Chi-square tests were used to identify statistically significant 
differences, the results of which appear in Table 8 below. 
 
Defined Benefit
29%
Defined 
Contribution
25%
Cash Balance
22%
Mix of Plans
24%
83 
 
Table 8: Results of Chi-Square Tests, Teacher Plan Choice and Key Teacher Characteristics 
 
Defined 
Benefit 
Defined 
Contribution 
Cash 
Balance 
Mix of 
Plans X2 p 
Group (n=99) (n=83) (n=73) (n=81) 
  Future Teachers 49 35 47 44 8.03 0.05 
Alt. Cert. Teachers 26 39 18 21 13.17 0.004 
Regular Public Teachers 23 9 8 16 7.54 0.06 
       Demographic 
Characteristics 
      Minority Teachers 13 9 8 9 0.36 0.95 
Male Teachers 33 37 26 22 5.6 0.13 
       Subject 
      English Teachers 17 26 21 22 5.41 0.14 
Math Teachers 21 33 19 16  10.67 0.01 
Science Teachers 18 22 15 21 2.41 0.49 
History/Soc. Stud. 
Teachers 17 20 13 18 1.73 0.63 
Special Education 
Teachers 12 12 10 11 0.2 0.98 
Other Subject Teachers 37 5 10 16 30.89 > 0.001 
       Grade Level 
      Elementary Teachers 21 19 21 21 1.42 0.70 
Middle School Teachers 36 35 25 27 1.65 0.65 
High School Teachers 47 27 27 31 4.87 0.18 
       Importance of 
Retirement 
      Priority Now 40 28 17 23 6.61 0.09 
Priority Later 25 23 21 20 0.44 0.93 
Not a Priority 2 8 5 9 6.54 0.09 
 
 
Which group a teacher belonged to (future teacher, alternatively certified teacher, or 
traditionally certified urban public school teacher) did have a significant relationship with plan 
choice.  Future teachers were more likely to choose a cash balance, while alternatively certified 
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teachers were more likely to choose a defined contribution plan.  Traditionally certified urban 
public school teachers chose both defined benefit and a mix of plans at higher rates than 
expected, though this relationship fell just short of statistical significance (p=0.056), possibly due 
to the smaller sample size in this group. 
 
 The subject a teacher taught also had a statistically significant relationship with plan 
choice.  Specifically, math teachers were more likely to choose a defined contribution plan, 
while teachers in the arts and physical education (grouped together) were more likely to choose a 
defined benefit plan.  This makes sense if math teachers feel better able to understand investing 
and more comfortable making their own choices, a supposition that was supported in the focus 
groups.  One future math teacher said he preferred a defined contribution plan because, “it's still 
in your hands, you still have the power to decide your own investments and make your own 
investments.”  A traditionally certified math teacher said she liked the idea of putting her 
retirement in a defined contribution plan because “you can kind of play with and watch the 
market and decide what you want to do, where you want to put your money, and you know just 
kind of play with it.”  On the other hand, in the same focus group an art teacher said, “I mean, 
I’m an art teacher. I don’t worry about. I’m not like you are. I don’t think about the percentages 
and where it goes and what happens to it.” 
 No statistically significant differences were found between male and female teachers, 
between minority and non-minority teachers (defined as a binary variable due to the low number 
of minority teachers in the sample), or between elementary, middle, and high school teachers.  
Teachers were also asked how important retirement is in making their career decisions 
(“Planning for retirement is very important to me and impacts the career decisions I make now,” 
“Planning for retirement is not a priority for me now, but it will be in the future,” or “Planning 
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for retirement is not an important factor for me in making career decisions”), with the idea that 
those who thought more about retirement might have different plan preferences, but no 
statistically significant relationship between the response to this question and plan choice was 
found. 
 
What Do Teachers Know About Retirement, and When Do They Know It? 
 What teachers know about retirement and when they know it is key in determining how 
pensions can be used as a policy lever to attract and retain high-quality teachers.  If teachers do 
not understand (and value) the pensions offered to them when they are entering the profession, 
then pensions cannot help attract teachers.  Similarly, if they do not understand (and value) these 
incentives early in their careers, pensions cannot help retain them.  Therefore, one major area of 
discussion in the focus groups was what teachers know about their retirement plans, and 
retirement in general. 
 
Future Teachers 
 It is a logical expectation that future teachers know less about teacher retirement plans 
than those who are already teaching and contributing to one.  As predicted, when future teachers 
were asked to explain what they knew about teacher retirement plans, they claimed to know very 
little.  In fact, in both future teacher focus groups, the initial response to “tell me what you know 
about teacher retirement” was “nothing.”  One teacher education student said: 
I know there is some sort of pension that you can put into but I don’t know how it works, 
how much it is, how long you have to teach to get it, or if it even exists anymore with the 
new budget changes. 
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However, when probed, future teachers did know a bit about teacher retirement plans. One future 
history teacher was able to explain the basic structure of a defined contribution plan: 
I know it builds up for the years you work at the job. I know it increases from there. And 
I think that if you were to work at a job for 40 years as opposed to 24 years you get more 
retirement funds.  
 
 When asked about retirement in general, five of the eight teacher education students 
interviewed mentioned defined contribution plans, with which they seemed more familiar.  As 
one future teacher said, when asked what he knew about retirement:  
I would say IRAs just because that's what I remember studying in (personal finance) 
class. Like it's out of your own money how much you put away, and your company can 
help you out with that but it depends on the company you work for, or I guess the school 
system you work for.  
 
Future teachers also seemed unsure about their employer’s role in retirement versus their 
own, or whether their employer would contribute at all.  One teacher education student said, “I 
don’t know if public schools match (contributions) but I know some companies do.”  Another 
said:  
I know that there are companies that match contributions into retirement funds so that if 
you're drawing from your paycheck to put into a retirement fund your company matches 
that but I don't know if public schools do that.  
 
 Future teachers were also asked how they got their information on retirement, and most 
often mentioned family members.  According to one future teacher: 
My mom bothers me all the time about starting something where I'm saving already. She 
has been since I became of working age when I was 18 working at (company) but it's not 
something I think about very often so I'm not really aware of how it works at public 
schools.  
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Another future teacher agreed that her main source of retirement information was her parents: 
My mom works in public schools and she just changed jobs so talking about the benefits 
of her elementary school job versus her community college job is something that had 
come up.  
 
In both future teacher focus groups, participants repeatedly stated that they “should know 
more” about retirement.  In the second group in particular, there was enthusiasm among all four 
participants about taking a class on the subject as part of their teacher training, an idea that they 
came up with unprompted.  As one participant explained:  
Literally the only reason that I think about retirement at all is because of this terrifying 
personal finance class I took where we had to use these complicated Excel spreadsheets 
to put in how much money we would have left to live off of to save at 22 versus 32 
versus 42. And you know, those first ten years make a very big difference. And I was 
like, “I’ll start thinking about it when I’m in my mid to late thirties” and I mean it’s like 
75 percent of your retirement savings potentially gone if you don’t make really smart 
decisions for the next 30 years at that point. So I guess if someone hadn’t sat me down 
and said to me the first the first 10 to 15 years make a really big difference, I would have 
been like, “I’m not making enough at this point for it to really matter” and just not have 
thought about it. 
 
Another teacher in the group agreed that a class on retirement and other financial issues for 
future teachers would be a good idea, stating, “I would definitely benefit from a discussion on 
this now rather than later.”  A third suggested a specific timeline for such a class:  
Maybe right after student teaching where you are about to set off to go into interviews 
and things like that. Maybe like have another class that coincides with student teaching or 
something along those lines that goes over plans like this or goes over how to interview 
for specific jobs, what people are looking for, what you are supposed to say, different 
things like that. Almost a prep—like we’re sending you off into the world and this is 
what you’re going to have to confront and this is what you need to know about it. 
 
Overall, as expected, the teacher education students that participated in these focus 
groups did not know much about teacher retirement plans.  Their knowledge of retirement in 
general was focused on defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)s and IRAs, and they were able 
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to describe how these plans worked and knew that it was important to start saving for retirement 
early.  Future teachers often indicated that their knowledge about retirement came from their 
parents, either by watching how their parents saved for retirement or by their parents discussing 
retirement with them directly.  Three future teachers also mentioned taking a personal finance 
class in high school or college. 
 An interesting and unexpected finding is the enthusiasm these future teachers expressed 
for learning about retirement and the other “real world” aspects of teaching.  In fact, the second 
group spent almost a third (16 minutes) of their focus group time discussing ideas for a class on 
the subject.  This is encouraging in terms of using pensions as a policy lever to attract teachers to 
the profession.  While they know very little about retirement, teacher education students 
understand its importance and are eager to learn about it, making pre-service an ideal time to 
inform them on the subject.   
Additionally, the fact that these teacher education students were more familiar with 
defined contribution plans is good news for policymakers that are looking to move toward these 
types of plans for financial reasons.  It seems likely that if incoming teachers were offered 
defined contribution plans, they would not be aware that this had not always been the norm in the 
teaching field.  These future teachers were also unsure of their employer’s role in their retirement 
savings, and some did not know whether their employers would contribute to their retirement at 
all.  If the next generation of teachers does not expect as much from their employers when it 
comes to retirement, they may be more willing to accept alternatives to current pension plans 
than veteran teachers would be.  
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Current Teachers 
 Not surprisingly, current teachers (traditionally and alternatively certified) were more 
knowledgeable about their retirement plans than were future teachers.  This makes sense given 
that many of them reported one of their main sources of information about retirement to be their 
own paychecks.  As one teacher said, “I found out about (the retirement plan) by looking at my 
pay stub and just, you know, asking questions.”  This teacher even produced his pay stub from 
his desk and showed the retirement deductions to the group as he explained what he knew about 
the system.   
 Teachers also reported getting retirement information from the district, though the 
attention they paid to this information varied, most noticeably according to how close they were 
to retirement age.  A veteran elementary school teacher explained: 
There’s a yearly thing that (state)- it sounds very official- they do send us a thing for our 
retirement account.  It’s like a mini-newsletter from them. So probably, once a year they 
send you one that’s official with your earnings per year. And like I said, it talks about this 
is what you can expect if you retire at age whatever. Full benefits at age this and so many 
years of service, but every once in a while they send you a little blurb in our mailboxes. 
 
Other teachers in her focus group indicated that they remembered receiving this information but 
not paying attention to it. As a mid-career teacher stated: 
You get the reports from it every year from the retirement system and they’ll tell you, 
you know, here are your earnings and if you retire this year you’ll get this much per 
month.  I don’t pay too much attention to it. 
 
 The level of knowledge about their retirement plan was similar across regular and 
alternatively certified teachers, and also varied noticeably according to experience.  Not 
surprisingly, teachers who had been in the classroom longer knew more about their retirement 
plans than early career teachers, especially those in their first year.  The most experienced 
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teacher in the regular teacher focus groups, who had been in the classroom for 34 years, 
explained the plan in some detail: 
The (State) Consolidated Retirement System is what it is called. Through the state we are 
offered a retirement and so much money out of our paycheck is taken each time. And you 
know really, as close as I am to it, I really haven’t looked into it. You’re just always 
paying into it and so, you know, there is that option and of course if you retire early you 
don’t get your full retirement so I’m looking into that. And I believe as far as payments 
per month you get, like, an average of your top five earning years or something like that 
as a teacher. So I’m counting on that and I’m in a 403B also as far as through the school 
system goes. 
 
On the other end of the experience spectrum, a first-year teacher in one of the regular 
certification groups said: 
I don’t have a clue. I’m really naïve to this. My head has been…I don’t really care. Now 
that I think about it I know they mentioned something about retirement stuff at new 
teacher orientation and went on about that kind of thing but I checked that I was 
interested but nobody ever got back to me on doing it. 
 
Early career alternatively certified teachers also mentioned learning about retirement at new 
teacher orientation.  A first year teacher explained: 
What I know is mostly from, and admittedly it is not much, but it is from pretty much 
professional development day which was last August for those in the first time 
teaching… And that’s pretty much about it. I should pay closer attention.  
 
A third-year alternatively certified teacher added: 
You fill out all that paperwork and it explains all of it but eventually it’s like piles and 
you just start signing things. So, I think we had sessions, especially about the private 
contribution type programs, but I think that’s about it.  
 
A mid-career alternatively certified teacher explained how the attention he paid to his retirement 
plan changed over time: 
On your paycheck you see that such and such amount went to, whatever, the teacher 
retirement system type of thing, but I started paying more attention to it as I got older 
than when I was a first year teacher. Fresh out of college I was just like, “Hey I got a job! 
I’m employed! Great!” But now that I am a little bit older and actually thinking about 
retirement systems or retirement in general I started to pay more attention to it. 
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 In addition to the defined contribution plan offered by the state, teachers in the district 
in which these focus groups were conducted are provided information by their schools on 
additional retirement savings through a 403(b) (defined contribution) plan.  The majority of 
teachers in both the traditional and alternatively certified focus groups indicated that they 
participated in this plan, and discussed the 403(b) more than the defined benefit plan when asked 
what they knew about retirement.  Though some were unclear on whether their employer 
matched their 403(b) contributions (they do not), teachers that participated in both plans seemed 
to understand more about their 403(b) than their defined benefit plan. As one alternatively 
certified teacher explained: 
There is a part of the salary that is automatically taken out of your paycheck right up 
front- you never actually see it and it goes directly to the pension system. But then there 
is the opportunity as well for additional private-type investments, like a 403(b) type 
investment which would be your own personal money—not that the pension isn’t, but it 
would be above and beyond what is required by the pension contribution. 
 
 One of the traditionally certified teachers was a career changer, who was familiar with 
defined contribution plans from his previous job and stated: 
I know that for a lot of companies there’s a retirement (plan), the 401(k), that I had 
through my other job and the 403B is just the educational version of that. It’s something-  
investments- that you can pay in and ultimately have sent back when you retire.  
 
Teachers who participated in these plans seemed excited about them, and eager to discuss 
their investment strategies.  As one veteran teacher told her colleagues: 
What I do is I max mine out. The government tells you, legally per year, you are allowed 
to invest so much through a 403B. So what we’ve been doing, my husband and I, is 
maxing it out. You take that and then after you’ve worked 20 years for a school system 
you can add 2,000 dollars to your max amount and if you are over a certain age, 50, you 
can max them out a couple more years which I do.  
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A common theme when discussing their defined contribution plans was choice, with 
several teachers expressing that they liked being able to invest in a way that suited their needs 
and “move money around.”  Those who did not participate in the 403(b) plan, however, saw this 
type of choice as a negative thing, with one teacher explaining that she did not want to make her 
own investment choices because “you know you’re the person that messed up, and you have eat 
Spaghetti-Os versus steak because you didn’t know the information.” 
 It is no surprise to learn that teachers who are in the classroom and contributing to 
retirement know more about it than teacher education students.  However, two interesting 
findings did emerge regarding the retirement knowledge of current teachers.  First, teachers were 
generally more knowledgeable about the 403(b) plan offered by the district than they were about 
their main defined benefit retirement plan.  There could be several reasons for this.  First, since 
the 403(b) is managed by a private company, this company may have made more of an effort to 
inform teachers about the plan.  One teacher even mentioned a representative from this company 
coming to his house to go over the details of the plan with him.  Second, since teachers have to 
actively opt into this plan (rather than the defined benefit plan which is automatic), they may pay 
more attention to what it is they are choosing.  They also have choices of different types of 
investments within the 403(b) plan, which may encourage them to learn even more about how 
the plan works in order to determine the best choice for their individual situation.  Finally, 
because teachers have investment choices if they participate in the 403(b), they may be more 
likely to discuss these choices with other teachers and learn from each other.  In these focus 
groups it was certainly the case that teachers compared notes on their investments, and they may 
do so in the teacher’s lounge as well. 
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 The second interesting finding is that while pre-service teachers seemed quite eager to 
learn about retirement, early career teachers were noticeably less so.  They mentioned having 
“other things to worry about” and taking teaching “one day at a time.”  Some, particularly in the 
alternatively certified groups, also indicated that they didn’t plan to stay in teaching very long 
and therefore weren’t particularly concerned about the retirement system.  This is important 
because it suggests that early career teachers may be too busy with the immediate concerns of 
their classrooms to be interested in learning about retirement.  Therefore, if policymakers want to 
inform young teachers about their retirement incentives, pre-service may be the best time to do 
so. 
 
What Factors Influence Teacher Retirement Plan Choice? 
 Before the second part of the focus groups, teachers were shown the video about 
different retirement plans and completed the survey.  They were then asked to discuss which plan 
they preferred and why.  Their responses mainly centered around three considerations.  The first 
was mobility, the extent to which they planned to teach a full career in one state.  The second 
was career plans, whether they intended to teach for their full career at all.  The third, and 
perhaps most interesting, was issues of risk, control, and trust.  This encompasses the extent to 
which teachers had faith in the retirement system in general, whether they felt more comfortable 
managing their own money or having the system do it for them, and how they felt about the risks 
inherent in the stock market. 
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Mobility 
 In five of the six focus groups, teachers identified mobility as an important issue.  
Because defined benefit retirement plans penalize mobility across states, teachers who expected 
to move to different states over the course of their teaching careers, or those who were not sure 
of their plans, did not prefer this plan type.  This was an especially prevalent concern among 
future teachers and alternatively certified teachers.  One future teacher even identified the ability 
to move around as one of the factors that drew him to the profession: 
 
I think that's one of the things that attracts  me to education is that I'm getting an 
education degree and I can use that in any state, I mean I might have to take another 
couple Praxis tests, but generally I can live and teach wherever I want to be because there 
are teachers everywhere.  
 
Another future teacher agreed: 
 
I think mobility is key. Especially since right now looking forward I don’t know what’s 
next. You know what I mean? I can’t see into the future and know that I’m going to be 
moved to, I don’t know, moved to somewhere—Kansas—and stay in Kansas for 30 years 
teaching, which would make the (defined benefit plan) beneficial to me. So I feel like 
having that mobility and the ability to move around and maybe change states would be 
ideal. 
 
A third future teacher simply expressed, “Something important for me would be being able to 
kind of move states because I don’t know where I’m going to end up.”  Another was critical of 
the current defined benefit retirement system for penalizing mobility: 
I find it strange that there's not a framework for a retirement plan that goes across state 
borders, just because these days people move around so much more than they did in the 
70's and 80's. We're much less hometown focused and more a global community.  
 
 The alternatively certified teacher groups agreed about the importance of retirement 
plan portability, with some of the teachers in these groups already having experienced lost 
pension benefits as a result of moving states.  As one alternatively certified teacher explained: 
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I did teach for five years (in another state) and so I basically lost all of that money. I did 
also have private investments, and that can be rolled over, but the pension is basically lost 
in the massive retirement system for all time.  
 
Another alternatively certified teacher described a similar situation: 
 
Having taught in two states prior to this and left and not having been vested in either of 
them it’s almost like starting over again for me so that is a very unattractive feature- the 
lack of portability of pension plans from one state to another.  
 
 Even among alternatively certified teachers who had not taught in more than one state, 
the idea of portability was important.  One teacher said she did not choose a defined benefit plan 
because “the fact that it is not capable of being portable across all states is enough for me to not 
really consider it.”  Another teacher in her group agreed: 
I don’t particularly see myself staying in any state period. I mean, I’ve lived in eight 
states, my dad was in the army, it’s kind of, you know, three or four years and then I’m 
ready for something new. So something that is state based doesn’t really appeal to me 
that much.  
 
  
 Among traditionally certified current teachers, portability was less of a concern, and in 
one group did not come up at all.  It is interesting that both focus groups of traditionally certified 
current teachers contained young teachers as well as veterans, but the young teachers in these 
groups did not mention portability to the same extent as their alternatively certified or pre-service 
peers, if at all.  Some of the veteran teachers, however, did talk about their experiences moving 
states.  One teacher explained how she wished she had understood more about how moving 
states affected her retirement: 
I taught my first nine years in (another state). I knew nothing about retirement. We 
moved here. So when I went to sign all the papers and get out of (other state), the lady 
asked me what you want to do with your retirement money. I said, “I don’t know. It’s 
nine years worth. What would you do?” And she was a young woman. She said most 
people take the money and run. So that’s what I did. I pulled my money out. Lo and 
behold, what I didn’t know is that I was already vested, I could have turned it over into 
the (this state) Retirement System, and added nine years, see.  So even though I’ve taught 
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for 34 years, I, you know, that would have been good enough for me to retire now with 
full benefits but now I’m nine years behind in (this state).   
 
 The fact that mobility was more important to future teachers and alternatively certified 
teachers than to traditionally certified current teachers may help explain why more teachers in 
the latter group preferred defined benefit pensions.  It is interesting to note, however, that the 
most popular choice of plan among the future teachers surveyed was a defined benefit plan, a 
finding at odds with the importance the future teacher focus groups placed on mobility.  One 
reason for this may be that, knowing very little about teacher retirement, many future teachers 
may not have thought about mobility unless someone else brought them up.  While portability is 
mentioned in the informational video preceding the survey, it is just one of many features 
discussed.  In the focus groups, it may be the case that once one future teacher mentioned 
wanting to be able to move between states without penalty, others who may not have considered 
this originally agreed.   
  
Career Plans 
 A second major theme in the discussions of why teachers prefer one retirement plan 
over another is their career plans, specifically how long they plan to remain in teaching.  As 
expected, teacher education students were not completely sure of their career plans.  
Nonetheless, many expressed the desire to pursue career options outside of teaching at some 
point in the future.  As one teacher education student stated: 
I plan to change careers at least a few times in my lifetime. I would still work in 
education but not be in the classroom the whole time so and that's one thing to consider 
for retirement I think, how often you change careers because I think that definitely affects 
your retirement. If you stay in the same career the whole time your retirement is going to 
be higher, all other things being equal, as opposed to changing careers.   
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Another student agreed, and pointed out that the retirement plans currently offered to teachers 
might not be keeping up with the employment patterns of his generation: 
It kind of seems like (the defined benefit plan) is maybe a little antiquated because people 
change careers a lot these days and maybe we need to change retirement plans or change 
retirement trends as well.  
 
 
 Three of the eight future teachers interviewed indicated that they valued the security of 
defined benefit plans, but were not sure these plans were the best choice if they did not plan to 
spend a whole career in the classroom.  These future teachers said they preferred cash balance 
plans or a mix of defined benefit and defined contribution plans because they wanted “the best of 
both worlds.”  As one future teacher who chose a cash balance plan explained: 
 
I do like (the defined benefit plan) that you can never outlive your annuity. But I can also 
see on the flip side that can be kind of restrictive to be getting the same amount every 
year. You know, it is the same kind of thing for me, like, I don’t know for sure that I’m 
going to be teaching for forty-three years. So a plan that relies on me to be teaching for 
forty-three years to be worth anything doesn’t do a lot for me. I also don’t really like that 
you have to retire at a certain time or you start losing theoretical money. I want to be able 
to retire whenever I want to retire. I don’t want to have to say, be older, and say, “Well, I 
really want to stay and I think I can do great things for these kids but I’m losing all this 
money”.  
 
Some future teachers did plan to spend their whole careers teaching, and therefore were 
not concerned about being able to transfer retirement funds.  As a future English teacher 
explained: 
What is comes down to for me is I really want to teach. That’s what I want to do. And if I 
spend the rest of my life in the classroom and never do anything else as a job then that’s 
okay with me at this point. So, I came into this with my eyes wide open. I knew that 
teachers don’t get paid anything close to what they are actually worth. And I knew that 
they don’t get retirement plans that are close to how much work they do.  
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It is interesting to note that if this teacher does spend her whole career in teaching, she 
may be eligible for quite a generous pension.  The fact that she does not realize this means that 
pension incentives are not influencing her behavior, and clearly cannot do so unless she 
understands what these incentives are. 
 
 In the alternatively certified teacher focus groups, many teachers expressed clear plans 
to leave teaching at various times in the future.  This is not surprising given that the stated goal 
of some alternative certification programs is to recruit teachers to spend only a few years in the 
classroom before they move on to other careers.  As one first-year alternatively certified teacher 
explained: 
I’m not currently planning on being a teacher longer than a year or two after this. I would 
like to stay in education but I’m not sure what I’ll do exactly.  
 
Another alternatively certified teacher expressed more definite plans: 
 
I’m thinking about going to school possibly to study something different. I would like to 
own my own business actually. One of the things that this year did for me was realizing 
that, you know, at least personally where I’m working in (district), it would be difficult to 
raise a family with my salary if not impossible. It’s not the quality of life I would like to 
have and yeah, I’m honestly thinking about the amount of money I would be able to 
make with this career as opposed to something else I could do.   
 
Some alternatively certified teachers did plan to stay in the classroom, and others had 
already stayed in teaching longer than they initially expected.  As an alternatively certified 
middle school teacher explained:  
I didn’t think I would retire as a teacher. It wasn’t really an issue because I didn’t think 
I’d be in that profession to ever retire as a teacher anyway so I wasn’t concerned about it. 
It was a short-term thing for me or so I thought.  
 
That teacher had been teaching for 8 years, and expressed a desire to move on to another career 
at some point, but had no immediate plans to do so.   
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 None of the current teachers expressed plans to leave teaching for any reason other than 
retirement, though when they planned to retire varied, with some planning to do so as possible 
and others to stay in the classroom longer.  One teacher who was approaching retirement but 
continued working for financial reasons explained:       
I wanted to retire at age 50 and then my husband and I…I’m now 56…and my next goal 
was 55 but I have my youngest with one more year of college so we were like, okay we’ll 
keep working. But then my husband looked at me just a couple of weeks ago and said to 
me, “You know, I think you should work until age 60 because of your healthcare, through 
(district).”  Because before that you’d have the opportunity to do (private) insurance but 
that is very expensive but if you can hang in there until you’re 60, (district) has to provide 
you with health insurance. I don’t know all the details but it is there, so I don’t have to 
buy my own insurance. I don’t want to work until 60, though.  I’m feeling a little burnout 
honestly. 
 
 
Some teachers planned to stay in teaching longer, in some cases for as long as they were 
able.  As one teacher put it: 
 
I want to (retire) around 78.  I don’t ever want to not work.  I want to be able to work 
until they kick me out. Yeah, until they kick me out.   
 
 
 Whether they planned to spend a whole career in teaching or not was a major factor 
determining teachers’ preferred retirement plans.  As expected, alternatively certified teachers, 
who generally did not plan to spend an entire career in the classroom, preferred defined 
contribution plans while traditionally certified teachers, who did plan to teach until retirement, 
preferred defined benefit plans.  It is once again noteworthy that the preferences future teachers 
expressed in the focus groups did not reflect the preferences of future teachers in the survey.  
While the majority of future teachers surveyed preferred defined benefit plans, many future 
teachers in the focus groups said they did not plan to spend their whole career in teaching and 
therefore preferred defined contribution or cash balance plans. 
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Risk, Control, and Trust 
 
 A final key issue that came up in the focus groups was that of risk, control, and trust.  It 
is expected that teachers who are more risk averse would prefer defined benefit plans as the risk 
in the plans in borne by the employer, while teachers who are more comfortable with risk may 
choose defined contribution plans where they bear the risk themselves.  An unexpected issue that 
arose in these focus groups, however, was how risk was defined.  Especially among future 
teachers and alternatively certified teachers, many focus group participants expressed distrust of 
“the system” which led them to prefer defined contribution plans where they felt more in control 
of their own retirement savings.  As one future teacher explained: 
You have to worry about state funding and I don't, I mean, I know there's some 
guarantees about this stuff, but I have real worries that social systems like this are going 
to fall through in our lifetime. Certainly by retirement age, without knowing very much 
about it, it just seems that this is not sustainable in this model and that it might get fixed 
but there will have to be some horrible thing happen before, and that could end up with 
teachers losing pensions and with state employees losing pensions, and that would be 
horrifying to happen when we're thirty-eight or something and have been teaching for 
however long, however many years. 
 
Another future teacher expressed similar concerns: 
 
The thing that makes me nervous is that schools are failing right now and being closed, 
and so if I have a plan that is entirely reliant on the school managing my retirement funds 
what happens if the school closes or the district becomes bankrupt or something like that?  
I think that part of the reason that that’s something that I think about more than I maybe 
would have if I decided to teach five years ago is just because of how crazy things have 
become in the past couple of years. So I think, part of the reason the 401K is attractive to 
me is that is my money and I can take it and you know, hand it to a financial consultant 
who is going to move it around if it needs to be moved around. I kind of tend to trust the 
stock market a little so being able to put it in the stock market would be a good thing for 
me. 
 
Alternatively certified teachers echoed this theme, comparing defined benefit retirement 
systems to Social Security, which they did not expect to be around when they retired.  As one 
teacher stated: 
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I feel like the people in our generation have been trained not to expect for (Social 
Security) to be there. But, you know, they are starting to follow the reserve and all this 
stuff to fund it currently and I think that would be my biggest worry with the pension 
system; that it is going to kind of have the same types of problems so it’s hard for a 
teacher to really rely on that being there.   
 
Another agreed, saying that this was the main reason for his choice of a defined contribution 
plan: 
I would go for the defined contribution. Because although in the defined benefit 
supposedly the risk is on the employer, I think in the long run it might also be on the 
employee given the potential collapse of the market, you know or whatever, inflation of 
the dollar over the next twenty years, who knows.  I think I would prefer the defined 
contribution just so I can have more control over my financial destiny I suppose.  
 
He elaborated on this point later in the discussion, comparing defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans:  
 
It seems like historically (defined benefit) has been a pretty good deal. Teachers that are 
retiring now are pretty happy with it. On the other hand I wonder if teachers of my 
generation…it’s tough to say what the political and economic climate will be like in 
thirty years. There’s already talks around the country that I’ve heard of, you know, of 
having—of multiple governments—having to start cutting pensions in order to balance 
the budget and that’s not specifically us. We’re really in debt as a country and I don’t 
think it is the same in 2011 as it was in 1960 where you got a reasonable guarantee that 
the money you put it would get back to you in forty years and it would be more or less 
the same value.  
 
 
 Even when they did not express outright distrust of the pension system, many future 
teachers and alternatively certified teachers said they would prefer to be in charge of their own 
retirement investments.  As one future teacher said, in explaining why he selected a defined 
contribution plan: 
The biggest thing is the fact that I can be in control of my own investments. That’s what I 
like because I would feel more secure that I would know what's going on. Even though 
the risk is on me I would still feel more secure that I can move around and adopt other 
careers and still have a say in what my retirement is going to be.   
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He went on to explain that, “I would feel better if I lost because of my investments than if I had 
no control over the school losing funding.  It's like you feel like you're helpless.” Another future 
teacher said she chose the defined contribution plan for the same reason: 
 
I guess what I don’t like about the pension plan is it doesn’t seem like you have any 
control over the money until you retire and so you can’t say, “I’m comfortable with a 
little more risk” and you put it in this kind of account with a possibility of a higher payout 
at more risk or, “I’m not as comfortable with risk” and put it in the safest thing you 
have… I am uncomfortable with the idea that another entity is saying, “Oh yeah, we’re 
just going to hold on to this for you for the next fifty years or so and then we’ll cut you a 
check.”  I like to be able to feel like I have a little more control over my assets than that.   
 
Another future teacher also expressed a desire for more control than offered by the defined 
benefit plan: 
(Defined benefit) just seemed like too much state control over my retirement and I just 
don't like the idea of letting go and saying, “Here, use your formula and pay me my 
pension after thirty years.” 
 
 Many alternatively certified teachers also said they would like to control their own 
retirement investments and chose defined contribution plans for this reason.  As one teacher 
explained:   
I would probably still stick with the defined contribution just because I would have the 
control over how it was invested as opposed to just turning it over to someone else and 
hoping that their judgment or their intentions are the same as mine.  
 
 While the majority of future teachers and alternatively certified teachers expressed a 
desire to control their own investments, not all of them shared this view.  An alternatively 
certified teacher that preferred a defined benefit plan supplemented with a smaller defined 
contribution plan explained:  
 
I like it in the sense that there is relatively little risk because it is a defined benefit plan. 
The main part of the retirement, the mandated part, is defined benefit so it easy to know 
how much you are going to get and you know it is going to last forever. You’re never 
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going to run out of money so to speak as opposed to some other type of plan where 
defined contribution or some hybrid where how much money you get in a particular year 
depends on all kinds of market factors and you, there is a potential you can outlive your 
retirement. So the safety of it is nice. On the flipside, however, I don’t know if the return, 
I guess it is a tradeoff or whatever for the safety, the less risky means the return wouldn’t 
be as high as if I were to seek out my own sort of kind of financial planner to invest for 
me.  
 
Another alternatively certified teacher selected a defined contribution plan because of the 
portability, but also liked features of the defined contribution plan: 
 
I think really the most appealing thing about that is that, assuming the way it is supposed 
to and everything goes the way it should, I don’t ever have to worry about outliving my 
investment because I’m going to get that monthly or periodic check until the day that I 
die. There’s no risk of outliving my money.  
 
 
Among traditionally certified current teachers, security was a key issue when choosing a 
retirement plan.   Most of these teachers said they were happy with the defined benefit plan they 
participated in because it provided this security.  As one teacher explained: 
 
I like the defined benefit because if all else fails, if the market falls apart, of course that 
might affect that, but I still feel like it is always there as like a safety net.  
 
Another teacher said that she liked her current defined contribution plan because: 
 
It’s there.  It’s like, it’s almost a part of the benefit of being a teacher is that you know 
that something is set aside for you when you retire and you don’t have to think about it. 
It’s there for you.  You have retirement, you know?  It’s not like you are like, “Okay, I 
don’t have a paycheck anymore. What am I going to do now?”  
 
 Once again, it is interesting to note that the mistrust of “the system” and the desire to 
manage their own retirement funds expressed by most of the future teachers was at odds with the 
survey data indicating most future teachers preferred defined benefit plans.  Given the fact that 
most of these future teachers knew little or nothing about teacher retirement plans before they 
watched a brief video on the subject, it seems likely that their preferences may still have been 
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forming as they discussed various options during the focus groups.  One future teacher even said 
that he would like to “change (his) answer” as a result of points that were discussed.  This points 
to the importance of educating future teachers more thoroughly on retirement options if we want 
to get a clear sense of their preferences and opinions, and future research may focus on finding 
ways to do this, possibly including conducting focus groups with more future teachers. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter explored teacher retirement preferences, the reasons for these preferences, 
and teacher knowledge about retirement plans using an original survey and embedded focus 
groups.  These issues are critical in terms of using pensions as policy levers to recruit and retain 
high-quality teachers because they directly address whether teachers understand and value their 
pension incentives.  Several key findings emerged.  First, there is an overall interest among the 
teachers sampled in alternatives to defined benefit pension plans.  While defined benefit was the 
most popular plan choice across the different groups of teachers sampled, 71 percent preferred 
some type of alternative.  Additionally, alternatively certified teachers and math teachers 
preferred defined contribution plans over the other choices. Future teachers also expressed 
interest in alternatives, though defined benefit plans were the most popular choice among this 
group.  Evidence from the focus groups suggests that future teachers know little to nothing about 
retirement plans, however, and their preferences may take longer to think through than the 
survey format allowed.  Aligning the type(s) of pensions offered with teacher preferences may 
cause teachers to place a higher value on their pensions, increasing their effectiveness as a policy 
lever. 
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 In order to value their pensions, however, teachers must understand them, and not all of 
them do.  As expected, the focus groups revealed that current teachers knew more about 
retirement than future teachers, with teachers nearing retirement being the most knowledgeable.  
However, much of the knowledge in both groups was about defined contribution plans.  Future 
teachers described 401(k)s and IRAs when asked what they knew about retirement, and current 
teachers who contributed to an optional 403(b) discussed this with more frequency and at greater 
length than their defined benefit plan.  This may be good news for policymakers looking to move 
toward these types of plans for teachers.  Future teachers generally equated “retirement plans” 
with defined contribution plans, and this was what they assumed their employers would provide.  
While current teachers valued the security provided by their defined benefit plans, many of them 
also participated in an optional defined contribution plan about which they generally seemed 
enthusiastic.  Another key point is that although they knew very little about teacher retirement, 
the future teacher focus groups were eager to learn, especially compared to early-career teachers 
who indicated that they were busy with more immediate classroom concerns.   This suggests that 
the best time to provide teachers with information about retirement may be during pre-service 
training rather than when they are starting in the classroom. 
 In examining why teachers preferred one plan over another, three central issues 
emerged: mobility, career plans, and attitudes about risk, trust, and control.  As expected, 
teachers who had been or planned to be mobile across states (particularly the alternatively 
certified teachers) preferred defined contribution plans because of their portability.  Similar 
preferences were evident for those who did not plan to spend a whole career in teaching.  The 
third issue was a bit more complicated, as it encompassed preferences and attitudes that were not 
directly related to career plans.  Teachers who preferred to make their own investment decisions 
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preferred defined contribution plans, which allowed them to do so.  Many younger teachers 
indicated that they did not trust state systems to manage their money and did not expect defined 
benefit pension systems to survive until they were of retirement age, and therefore preferred 
alternatives, including cash balance and defined contribution plans.  Again, the future teacher 
groups seemed to be forming and refining their opinions throughout the discussion, which may 
explain why the opinions of focus group participants differed from overall survey trends in this 
group. 
 Together, the survey and focus groups provided valuable insight into what teachers 
know about their retirement plans and what they value in these plans, the first two components in 
using pension plans as policy lever to recruit and retain high-quality teachers.  In the next chapter 
I further discuss the implications of these findings and those in the previous chapter and propose 
ways in which states could align their retirement systems with desired teacher employment 
behavior.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: PENSION PLANS AS POLICY LEVERS 
 
 The preceding chapters presented evidence from the Schools and Staffing Survey, 
Teacher Follow-Up Survey, and original survey and focus group data on the extent to which 
teachers understand and value the incentives embedded in their pension plans.  Teachers 
understanding and valuing these incentives are the first two steps necessary in using retirement 
plans as a policy lever to attract and retain high-quality teachers.  However, the final, and as yet 
unaddressed, piece of the puzzle is aligning these incentives with desired teacher behavior.  If 
teachers understand and value their pension incentives (the extent to which this is the case will 
be revisited later in this chapter) and act in accordance with these incentives, it is critical for 
policymakers to examine whether the outcome is a positive one.  Otherwise, large amounts of 
money are being spent on policies that have at best neutral and possibly quite negative 
consequences for overall teacher quality. 
 It is outside the scope of this analysis to argue what retirement behavior policymakers 
should be trying to elicit from teachers.  In fact, this may differ from state to state and/or over 
time.  Rather, I present a series of possible policy objectives and examine what retirement plans 
and incentives could be utilized to achieve them.   Table 9 shows examples of possible policy 
objectives, the plans that may help meet them, and the incentives in these plans that are aligned 
with the desired behavior. 
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Table 9: Policy Objectives and Retirement Plan Incentives 
POLICY OBJECTIVE RETIREMENT PLAN INCENTIVES 
Retain teachers at the state 
level 
 
Defined Benefit  
 
 
Moving states results in a loss of 
pension wealth 
 
Retain teachers for a set 
length of time 
 
Defined Benefit  
 
 
Accrual patterns "pull" teachers to 
stay until set retirement age, then 
"push" them out 
 
Retain teachers longer 
Defined Benefit with 
increased age/service 
requirements 
 
Shift accrual patterns to "push" 
teachers out later 
 
 
 
Defined Contribution or 
Cash Balance 
 
 
Working longer results in more 
money spread over a shorter 
retirement 
 
 
Encourage burned-out 
teachers to leave 
Early Retirement 
Incentives 
 
Partial retirement benefits earlier 
encourages some teachers to leave 
 
 
Defined Contribution or 
Cash Balance 
 
Less incentive to stay until a certain 
age, teachers might retire even 
earlier 
 
Recruit better teachers 
 
 
Defined Contribution or 
Cash Balance 
 
 
Remove disincentives (vesting, 
backloading) to increase the overall 
teaching pool 
 
Recruit and retain teachers 
in shortage areas 
 
 
Plan(s) preferred by 
teachers in these fields 
 
 
Provide strongest incentives to 
teachers who are most needed 
 
 
Retain better teachers 
longer 
 
 
Defined Contribution or 
Cash Balance coupled 
with Incentive Pay 
 
Better teachers make more money, 
state and teacher both contribute 
more toward retirement 
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 First let us assume that the policy objective is to retain teachers at the state level, that is, 
for teachers who begin teaching in a given state to remain teaching in that state until retirement.  
The current defined benefit system, which is generally not portable across states, contains 
incentives aligned with this objective.  As Costrell & Podgursky (2010) show, a teacher who 
works in two different states will have a much smaller pension under this plan than a teacher 
who works for the same amount of time in one state.  In one example illustrated by Costrell and 
Podgursky (2010), a teacher moving states can lose as much as 65 percent of her pension wealth 
compared to if she had taught a full career in a single state.  This presents a strong incentive for 
teachers to spend a whole career in one state.   
Traditionally, one of the purposes of pensions has been to reduce the cost of employee 
turnover (Blake, 2006).  The current defined benefit plans contain incentives to reduce turnover 
at the state level, but this may not actually reduce costs if most of the costs of teacher mobility 
are incurred at the district level.  If this is the case, incentives could theoretically be restructured 
to deter mobility across districts, though this may not be practical from an administrative 
standpoint.  If retaining teachers at the state level is not a key outcome for state policymakers, 
however, they may want to consider the extent to which the current, non-portable system of 
defined benefit teacher pensions may be deterring teachers from entering or continuing the 
profession if they plan to be mobile.    
 
If the policy objective is to control the age at which most teachers retire, the current 
defined benefit systems also present well-aligned incentives.  Costrell and Podgursky (2007, 
2008) document how the backloading in these plans “pull” teachers to stay in the classroom until 
they are eligible for full retirement benefits, while the defined benefit “pushes” them to leave at 
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this age because the added return from working an additional year is not enough to offset the loss 
of the pension for that year.  In the post-mandatory retirement era, this may be a way to 
encourage employees to leave when they are no longer able to perform their jobs as well as when 
they were younger due to declining energy and health. 
 However, it may be the case that the age at which most retirement systems “push” 
teachers out of the classroom is too young.  With many states offering full retirement to teachers 
in their early fifties while life expectancy continues to rise, a teacher might be eligible to collect 
a pension for longer than she taught.  Therefore, a policy objective might be to retain teachers in 
the classroom for longer than the current system does.  There are two ways pension incentives 
might be realigned to reach this goal.  First, the age and/or years of service at which a teacher is 
eligible for retirement benefits could simply be increased within the current defined benefit 
framework.  The Social Security Administration has instituted such a change, incrementally 
raising the minimum age for full benefits from 65 for those born before 1937 to 67 for those born 
after 1960 (Social Security Administration, 2010).  An alternative to this would be switching to a 
defined contribution or cash balance plans, which do not contain the incentive to retire at a 
certain age so as not to lose pension wealth.  In these plans, pension wealth accrues smoothly, 
and the longer a teacher works, the more money she will have to spread over a shorter 
retirement.  It is up to the individual teacher to decide when she has enough money to retire 
based on her financial situation, life expectancy, and other considerations.  By removing the 
incentive to retire at a certain time, teachers may choose to remain in the classroom longer, or 
may need to do so in order to save enough for retirement. 
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 On the other hand, an important policy objective might be to encourage teachers who 
are burned out or simply ill-suited to the profession to leave the classroom.  Since tenure laws in 
many states make it all but impossible to fire experienced teachers (Coleman et al., 2005), 
pension incentives may serve as a valuable tool to encourage such teachers to leave the 
profession.  Early retirement incentives in defined benefit plans seem to be well aligned with this 
objective.  Some states (not all states offer early retirement) offer a smaller but still substantial 
“push” at earlier ages and/or experience levels to encourage teachers to retire.  Nevada and 
Florida offer (reduced) early retirement benefits after only one year of service, which encourage 
teachers who want to leave the classroom to do so at whatever point they choose.  However, it is 
not clear that these plans necessarily target the right teachers.  They may encourage burned-out 
teachers to leave, or they may reward the most capable teachers for seeking positions elsewhere.  
SASS and TFS present mixed evidence on this issue, and further examination of which teachers 
take early retirement and why would be instructive in informing policy decisions. 
Going a step beyond early retirement incentives, which might encourage burned-out 
teachers to leave but still requires set age and service requirements (in most states) would be 
switching to defined contribution or cash balance plans, which, due to a lack of backloading, do 
not contain the “pull” to keep teachers working for any specific length of time.  Since these plans 
are portable and could be rolled over when a former teacher enters a new career, there is no 
disincentive for them to leave teaching.  This may be especially useful in encouraging the exit of 
mid-career teachers who would rather be doing something else but are not yet approaching early 
retirement age. 
 Next, let us assume that the policy objective is to recruit high-quality teachers.  This 
may be problematic because research has shown a weak relationship between observable 
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characteristics and credentials and teacher quality (Clotfelter et al., 2007; Glazerman et al., 2006; 
Goldhaber & Brewer, 1997, 2000), making it difficult to identify high-quality teachers on the 
front end.  Therefore the role of pensions in recruiting high-quality teachers might be to remove 
the disincentives to teaching for a few years with the goal of increasing the overall teacher 
applicant pool.  Switching to defined contributions of cash balance plans would align incentives 
with this goal.  If, as in these plans, vesting requirements were shorter or were eliminated 
altogether, and if pension wealth accrual were smooth rather than heavily backloaded, talented 
and motivated individuals who were considering teaching would have no disincentives 
embedded in the pension system discouraging them from trying it out for a few years.  This may 
increase the overall applicant pool for teaching positions, allowing administrators to choose 
teachers that were a better fit for their schools.  Finally, with no financial disincentive to leave 
the classroom, those teachers who tried teaching and were less successful (or simply ready to 
move on) might exit the profession, making room for other, better teachers.  While the role of 
pensions in recruiting higher quality teachers is perhaps the least easily tied to pension 
incentives, removing disincentives to free entry into, and exit from, the profession may be useful 
in achieving this goal.  
 
 While recruiting higher-quality teachers overall may be stretching the limits of teacher 
pensions as policy levers, they may be more effective in recruiting teachers in shortage areas.  If 
these shortages exist because teachers in these fields (such as math and science) have attractive 
options for other careers, removing the disincentives to teaching a few years as outlined above 
might encourage them to spend some time in the classroom before pursuing those options.  
Another way pension incentives could be aligned with recruiting teachers in shortage areas is to 
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offer the pension plans that these teachers prefer.  Though more research on this topic is needed, 
evidence presented in the previous chapter indicates that math teachers prefer defined 
contribution plans.  If there is a shortage of math teachers, it makes sense to do everything 
possible to attract math teachers over other teachers.  Adopting the retirement plans preferred by 
teachers in shortage areas, or giving teachers in shortage areas a choice of plans, might remove 
obstacles to their recruitment. 
 
 Finally, let us assume that the policy objective is to retain better teachers longer than 
worse teachers.  Currently, retirement systems are not aligned with this objective.  Because 
teachers are generally on a single-salary schedule and retirement benefits are based on final 
average salary, better teachers are not rewarded with better retirement benefits.  Combining a 
defined contribution or cash balance plan with an incentive pay system could create incentives 
for better teachers to stay longer.  Simply adding incentive pay (in the simplest terms, paying 
better teachers more) would not encourage better teachers to retire later.  In fact, it might do the 
opposite.  If these teachers are making enough money to invest outside of their pensions, the 
“pull” of the defined benefit plan might not be strong enough to keep them in the classroom until 
retirement age.  At the very least, the defined benefit “push” would still be in place, because 
every year a teacher works is a year she is not collecting her pension.  By combining incentive 
pay with defined benefit or cash balance plans, however, the incentives are aligned for high-
quality teachers to stay in the classroom as long as they are still able to maintain that level of 
quality.  As a teacher’s salary increases, so would the amount of money she and her employer 
contribute toward retirement, since both contributions are a percentage of overall salary.  A good 
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teacher would have incentive to stay in the classroom as long as both her salary and retirement 
benefits were growing, since she would not lose any of these benefits by continuing to work. 
 
 Overall, when considering all the possible policy objectives states might wish to pursue 
through teacher pension reform, the majority are best aligned with defined contribution or cash 
balance plans rather than the current defined benefit system in place in most states.  The current 
system encourages teacher retention at the state level, to which there may be no clear benefit, and 
encourages teachers to retire at a certain age, which may be too young (or too old, if a teacher is 
burned out and no longer effective).  The smooth accrual patterns of defined contribution and 
cash balance plans, on the other hand, allow teachers to select the appropriate age for retirement 
based on their own professional and financial situation.  There is no incentive in these plans to 
leave teaching for those who wish to stay past “regular” retirement age, and no incentive for 
burned-out teachers to “hang in there” until a set retirement date.  Additionally, the portability of 
these plans removes the disincentive for teachers who do not intend to teach for their entire 
career or who want the option to be geographically mobile to enter the profession.  This may 
increase the overall pool of teacher candidates, allowing districts and principals the opportunity 
to select the best teachers for their open positions. 
 A switch to defined contribution or cash balance plans would not (unless coupled with 
performance pay) automatically retain high-quality teachers at a higher rate, but it would remove 
the artificial “pull” and “push” of defined benefit plans that many teachers clearly respond to.  If 
better teachers enjoy teaching and receive positive feedback for a job well done, they may 
choose to stay in the classroom longer once the financial incentive for them to retire at a certain 
time is removed.  Conversely, if low-quality teachers would really prefer to pursue another 
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career, they may leave teaching earlier if they are not “pulled” by defined benefit plans to remain 
in the classroom until a set retirement age.   
 
 While aligning retirement incentives with desired teacher behavior is the last piece of 
the theoretical framework discussed here, it is actually the first piece that policymakers should 
consider.  If incentives are not aligned, making sure teachers understand them is at best a waste 
of time and possibly counterproductive if the incentives are structured counter to desired 
outcomes (encouraging teachers to retire too early, for example).  Once the proper incentives are 
in place, however, providing information to teachers is crucial.  Evidence from the 2003-2004 
SASS and TFS presented in Chapter III indicates that most teachers understand the incentives 
embedded in their retirement plans to retire at a certain age and experience level by the time they 
reach that point, with 76% percent of the teachers in their first year of eligibility for regular 
retirement taking this option.  Among those who retired, the primary reason they gave for doing 
so was simply “to retire” as opposed to moving, health, family, or other issues, and 39 percent of 
these teachers were reemployed immediately after retirement from teaching.  The reemployment 
data is interesting because it indicates that these teachers did not retire from teaching because 
they no longer wanted to work, but rather in response to some other incentive.  This is especially 
true given that the majority of these teachers are employed more than half-time, and many 
indicated that they had taken jobs in the education field.  Additionally, the total percentage of 
reemployed teachers may be higher since the Teacher Follow-Up Survey only captured those 
who took a new job within their first year out of the classroom. 
 However, evidence from the focus groups, presented in Chapter IV, indicates that 
younger teachers do not understand their retirement plans or the incentives embedded therein.  
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When pre-service teachers were asked about teacher retirement, they said they knew little or 
nothing about it, and when asked about retirement plans in general they described defined 
contribution plans.  Early career teachers knew that they were contributing to retirement by 
looking at their pay stubs to find out where their money was going, but did not think about it 
much beyond that.  Some early career teachers did not even know they were contributing to 
retirement at all, assuming that since they hadn’t signed up for anything they did not have a 
retirement plan.   
This is important to the extent that pensions are expected to influence the behavior of 
early career teachers and/or attract qualified individuals to the teaching profession.  While 
offering one type of retirement plan or another is unlikely to draw individuals into teaching that 
would not otherwise consider it as a career, those who do enter teaching should be educated as to 
how their career choices will affect their retirement benefits.  For example, most state systems 
currently penalize mobility across state lines, especially of a teacher is not in one state long 
enough to become vested.  This resulted in a loss of pension wealth for several teachers in the 
focus groups, particularly alternatively certified teachers but traditionally certified teachers as 
well.  If these teachers had understood this feature of their retirement plan, they might have made 
different choices.  As it happened, however, their pension plans did not achieve the objective of 
retaining them in the state because they did not understand this incentive. 
Once the importance of teachers understanding their retirement plans is established, a key 
question becomes how to best provide them with this information.  Focus groups indicated that 
pre-service teachers were very interested in learning about the retirement benefits they would be 
offered, along with the other “real-world” aspects of teaching such as salary.  It was also clear 
that teachers in their first few years were too busy managing their classrooms day-to-day to be 
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interested in discussing retirement (or anything else not of immediate practical concern).  
Therefore, a logical plan might be to integrate information about retirement into teacher training 
programs, both traditional and alternative.  In one focus group, pre-service teachers suggested 
that this be part of a class or workshop that coincides with student teaching, when teacher 
education students were beginning to think about applying for jobs.   
Another way to disseminate retirement information would be through state teacher 
retirement websites.  All 50 states and the District of Columbia have such sites, but the extent to 
which they are accessible and informative varies widely.  If states made sure these sites were 
easy for teachers to find (by linking to district pages, for example) and that the information they 
provided was clear and easy to understand, teachers might become better informed on their 
retirement plans and incentives.  If retirement incentives are properly aligned with desired 
teacher behavior, making sure teachers understand them is important for both states and for 
teachers.  If teachers do not understand their plans, they cannot respond to incentives in the way 
states intend.  They also may lose pension wealth unnecessarily, which should provide teachers 
unions with motivation to make sure their teachers understand their retirement plans as well.  
 
Finally, in considering pensions as a lever to recruit and retain high-quality teachers, 
policymakers must understand what teachers value in their retirement plans.  It is unlikely that 
pension incentives will ever be strong enough to totally override other considerations in teachers’ 
retirement behavior, but knowing what teachers value, and how this differs across different 
groups of teachers, can certainly make retirement incentives more effective. 
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Focus groups uncovered three key issues that teachers considered in assigning value to 
their retirement plans: flexibility to change careers, geographic mobility, and risk.  How they 
defined these things and the extent to which they ware important varied across (and somewhat 
within) groups.  Future teachers generally saw themselves as geographically mobile and possibly 
changing careers, and therefore were interested in retirement plans that did not penalize these 
choices.  They also expressed doubt that defined benefit plans would still be around when they 
reached retirement age, and indicated that they would prefer to make their own investment 
decisions than have their retirement assets managed by the state.   
Alternatively certified teachers expressed even stronger preferences for mobility and 
career change, with some of them already having experienced a loss of pension wealth due to 
moving states.  They too preferred plans that would allow them maximum flexibility, both in 
terms of location and career choice.  Like future teachers, they expressed doubt in the long-term 
sustainability of defined benefit plans and wondered if the benefits they promised would still 
exist when they reached retirement age.  
Traditionally certified public school teachers were generally satisfied with the current 
system, though the younger teachers in this group were often unclear on what their retirement 
benefits were.  Some of these teachers discussed suffering a loss of pension wealth due to 
interstate mobility, but most in this group did not see mobility as a key concern.  They were also 
not generally considering changing careers, so did not particularly value pensions that were 
portable from one career to another.  The primary concern among this group was security, which 
they felt was provided by their defined benefit plans.  Many teachers also liked that they “didn’t 
have to think about it,” and did not want a plan that required them to make their own retirement 
decisions.   
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Clear differences also existed among math teachers compared to teachers in other 
subjects.  Survey results show that math teachers overwhelmingly prefer defined contribution 
plans, and evidence from the focus groups indicates this is because they are comfortable with 
numbers and prefer to manage their own investments.  Preferences of teachers in other subject 
areas were not particularly different from the overall teacher pool in this study, but may become 
clearer in larger samples. 
Considering what teachers value in retirement plans overall is important for policymakers 
that want teachers to respond to the incentives in these plans.  Considering what teachers in 
specific groups value is also helpful in designing incentives that appeal to these groups.  For 
example, survey results in this study indicate that states interested in recruiting math teachers 
should offer defined contribution plans.  Since retirement preferences vary both across and 
within groups, states may also consider offering teachers a choice of retirement plan, provided 
the incentives in all the plans offered are aligned with desired teacher retirement behavior.  A 
few states have implemented choice in teacher retirement plans, and examining what plans 
teachers are choosing and how this is related to their retirement behavior and other 
characteristics is an interesting direction for future research. 
 
Reforming teacher retirement plans is of course not the only- or even the most effective- 
way to recruit and retain high-quality teachers.  However, current retirement costs represent a 
major expenditure in state education budgets that may not be achieving anything from a policy 
perspective, and may even be contributing to teacher shortages (Hansen, 2008).  When 
considering how teacher retirement can serve as a policy, states should consider three key points: 
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teachers must understand their retirement incentives, they must value them, and these incentives 
must be aligned with the desired retirement behavior.  This dissertation presented preliminary 
evidence on the first two points and considered how incentives in various retirement plans are 
aligned with policy objectives.  However, research into teacher retirement is an emerging field.  
As more data is collected and as more states consider and adopt alternatives to the current 
teacher retirement system,  additional research into teacher retirement preferences and behavior 
should be conducted, providing states with insight into how to best design retirement plans for 
the teachers of the 21st century.  
 
Conclusion 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I proposed that in order for teacher pensions to be 
used as a policy lever to attract and retain high-quality teachers, three conditions must be met.  
First, teachers must understand their pension incentives.  Second, they must value them enough 
to act upon them.  Finally, these incentives must be aligned with desired teacher retirement 
behavior.   
Evidence from the Schools and Staffing Survey and Teacher Follow-Up Survey 
presented in Chapter III indicates that the first two conditions are being met, at least by the time 
teachers reach regular retirement age, with 76% of teachers in their first year of retirement 
eligibility choosing to retire.  SASS data also indicates that the majority of teachers who leave 
the profession do so “to retire” and not due to family or health issues, staffing actions, or other 
reasons, and that more than a third of these teachers are reemployed immediately after retiring 
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from teaching.  This is further evidence that teachers who still want (or need) to work are leaving 
the classroom due to retirement incentives.   
However, SASS data does not allow us to examine when teachers become aware of their 
retirement incentives and what their retirement preferences might be.  In Chapter IV, original 
data from a survey and embedded focus groups is used to explore these issues.  Not surprisingly, 
focus group data indicates that young teachers (especially future teachers) know very little about 
their retirement plan, while older teachers are more knowledgeable.  An interesting finding in 
this area is that future teachers seem to be quite interested in learning about teacher retirement, 
indicating that pre-service training might be an ideal time to provide teachers with this 
information.  In terms of retirement preferences, defined benefit plans were the most popular 
option overall, but the majority of teachers preferred one of the alternatives: defined 
contribution, cash balance, or a mix of plans.  Differences in preference existed among teacher 
groups, with alternatively certified teachers and math teachers preferring defined contribution 
plans and future teachers preferring cash balance plans.  This provides preliminary evidence that 
the next generation of teachers may be interested in alternatives to traditional teacher pension 
plans when given the option. 
The final chapter of this dissertation focused on the extent to which teacher retirement 
plans are aligned with desired teacher retirement behavior.  While the definition of “desired” 
may vary by state and over time, it is likely that current defined benefit plans are not well-
aligned with most plausible policy objectives.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, defined 
contribution or cash balance plans may be better suited to produce desired teacher retirement 
behavior.  This is good news, given the interest of future teachers in these types of plans. 
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This dissertation presents an initial exploration of how teacher retirement plans serve as a 
policy lever to attract and retain high-quality teachers.  Due to limitations in the data, the 
findings should be viewed as preliminary, and the issues presented here researched further.   In 
particular, an important next step would be to expand the survey and focus group sample to the 
national level, possibly adding additional teacher groups of interest, such as charter school 
teachers.  If the results of a larger, nationally representative sample also indicate that 
alternatively certified teachers and future teachers prefer alternative pension plans, this is 
valuable information for policymakers and teachers’ unions alike.  It may be the case that 
alternative pension plans that will be less of a drain on state budgets can also serve to recruit and 
retain the next generation of high-quality teachers, a situation in which everyone wins. 
 
 
 
  
123 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
AFL-CIO update: threats to public worker pensions.  Retrieved June 17, 2008 from  
http://www.cwapublicandhealthcare.org/pensions/st-pension-threat-levels.html 
 
Allen, S., Clark, R., & McDermed, A. (1988). The pension cost of changing jobs. Research on  
Aging 10, 459–71. 
 
Allen, S., Clark, R., & McDermed, A. (1993). Pensions, bonding, and lifetime jobs. The  
Journal of Human Resources, 28(3), 463.  
 
American Federation of Teachers.  Face the facts on public pensions.  Retrieved June 17,  
2008 from http://www.aft.org/topics/pensions/facts.htm 
 
American Federation of Teachers.  Public sector defined benefit pensions.  Retrieved  
June 17, 2008 from http://www.aft.org/topics/pensions/defined_benefit.htm 
 
American Federation of Teachers.  The top 10 disadvantages of replacing defined benefit  
plans with defined contribution plans.  Retrieved June 17, 2008 from 
http://www.aft.org/topics/pensions/top10.htm 
 
American Federation of Teachers.  Traditional defined benefit pension plans: a tried and  
true system that benefits taxpayers.  Retrieved June 17, 2008 from 
http://www.aft.org/topics/pensions/tried_true.htm 
 
Barro, J., & Buck, S. (2010). Underfunded teacher pension plans: It's worse than you  
think. Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. 
 
Blake, D. (2006).  Pension Economics.  West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 
Bodie, Z., Marcus, A.J., & Merton, R.C. (1988).  Defined benefit versus defined  
contribution plans: what are the real trade-offs? In Bodie, Z. Shoven, J.B., & 
Wise, D.A. (Eds.)  Pensions In the U.S. Economy.  Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press. 
 
Brown, K. (2009). Teacher pensions and retirement in California. Paper presented 
at the National Center on Performance Incentives National Conference, Vanderbilt 
University, Nashville, TN. 
 
Cambron-McCabe, N. H., McCarthy, M. M. & Thomas, S. B. (2004). Public School Law:  
Teachers’ and Students’ Rights (5th ed.). Boston: Pearson Education. 
 
Clark, R., Craig, L. & Wilson, J. (2003).  A history of public sector pensions in the  
United States.  Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press. 
124 
 
 
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., & Vigdor, J. L. (2007). Teacher credentials and student  
achievement: Longitudinal analysis with student fixed effects. Economics of Education 
Review, 26(6), 673-682. 
 
Coile, C., & Gruber, J. (2007). Future Social Security entitlements and the retirement  
decision. Review of Economics and Statistics 89: 234–46. 
 
Coile, C., & Levine, P. (2006).Bulls, bears, and retirement behavior. Industrial and  
Labor Relations Review 59: 408–29. 
 
Coleman, J., Schroth, S.T., Molinaro, L., & Green, M.  (2005). Tenure: An Important  
Due Process Right or a Hindrance to Change in the Schools? Journal of Personnel 
Evaluation in Education, 18(3), 219-231.  
 
Costa, D. (1998).  The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880- 
1990.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Costrell, R. & McGee, J. (2010). Teacher pension incentives, retirement behavior, and  
potential for reform in Arkansas. Education Finance and Policy5(4): 492–518. 
 
Costrell, R. &Podgursky, M. (2007a).   Efficiency and equity in the time pattern of teacher  
pension benefits:  an analysis of four state systems. Washington, D.C.  The Urban Institute. 
Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research (CALDER). 
 
Costrell, R. &Podgursky, M. (2007b).  Golden peaks and perilous cliffs: rethinking Ohio’s  
 teacher pension system.  Thomas B. Fordham Institute.  
 
Costrell, R. &Podgursky, M. (2008).Peaks, cliffs, and valleys. Education Next, 8(1), 22-28. 
 
Costrell, R. &Podgursky, M. (2010).  Distribution of benefits In teacher retirement  
 systems and their implications for mobility.  Education Finance and Policy, 5(4),  
 519-557. 
 
Cox, S., Parmer, R., Tourkin, S., Warner, T. & Lyter, D. (2007).  Documentation for the 
2004–05 Teacher Follow-up Survey.  Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education 
Statistics. 
 
Darling-Hammond, L. & Green, J. (1994).  Beyond the commission reports: The coming  
 crisis in teaching.  Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 
 
DeArmond, M. &Goldhaber, D. (2009).  Scrambling the nest egg: How well do teachers  
understand their pensions and what do they think of alternative pension structures?  Paper 
presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives, Vanderbilt University, 
Nashville, TN. 
 
125 
 
Edwards, C. & Gokhale, J. (2006).  Unfunded state and local health costs:  $1.4 trillion.”   
 Washington, DC:  Cato Institute.   
 
Employee Benefit Research Institute (2006).  ‘Traditional’ pension assets lost dominance a  
 decade ago, IRA’s and 401(k)’s have long been dominant. Retrieved  
June 9, 2008 from http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/fastfacts/fastfact020306.pdf  
 
Folch-Lyon, E. & Trost, J. (1981).Conducting Focus Group Sessions. Studies in Family  
Planning, 12(12), 443-449. 
 
Foster, Elizabeth (2010). How Boomers can contribute to student success: Emerging encore  
career opportunities in K-12 education.  Washington, DC: National Commission on  
Teaching and America’s Future. 
 
Friedberg, L. & Owyang, M. (2002). Not your father’s pension plan: The rise of 401(k)  
and other defined contribution plans. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 
 84: 23–34. 
 
Freidberg, L. & Webb, A. (2005).Retirement and the evolution of pension structure. Journal of  
 Human Resources, 40(2), 281-308.  
 
Friedberg, L. & Turner, S. (2010). Labor market effects of pensions and implications for 
 teachers.  Education Finance and Policy, 5(4), 463-491. 
 
Furgeson, J.,  Strauss, R. & Vogt, W. (2006).  The effects of defined benefit pension incentives  
 and working conditions on teacher retirement decisions.”  Education Finance and Policy,  
 1(3), 316-348.    
 
Gaines, G.F.  (2000).  Beyond salaries: employee benefits for teachers in the SREB states.   
Atlanta, GA: Southern Regional Education Board. 
 
Graebner, W. (1978).“The economic and social functions of the teachers' pension.” 
History of Education Quarterly, 18(4), 397-417.  
 
Glazerman, Steven, Daniel Mayer, and Paul Decker. 2006. “Alternative Routes to  
 Teaching: The Impacts of Teach for America on Student Achievement and Other  
 Outcomes.”Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 25 (1): 75-96. 
 
Greene, W. (1990).Econometric analysis. New York: Macmillian Publishing. 
Goldhaber, D. D., & Brewer, D. J. (1997). Why Don't Schools and Teachers Seem to  
 Matter? Assessing the Impact of Unobservables on Educational Productivity. The  
 Journal of Human Resources, 32(3), 505-523. 
 
Goldhaber, D. D., & Brewer, D. J. (2000). Does Teacher Certification Matter? High  
 School Teacher Certification Status and Student Achievement. Educational  
126 
 
 Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 22(2), 129-145. 
 
Gustman, A.L. & Steinmeier, T.L. (1991).  The effects of pensions and retirement  
policies on retirement in higher education.  The American Economic Review,81(2), 111-
115. 
 
Gustman, A.L. & Steinmeier, T.L.  (1993).  Pension portability and labor mobility : : Evidence  
from the survey of income and program participation.  Journal of Public Economics, 
50(3), 299-323.  
 
Gustman, A.L., Mitchell, O.S. & Steinmeier, T.L. (1994).  The role of pensions in the  
labor market: a survey of the literature.  Industrial & Labor Relations Review,  
47(3), 417-439. 
 
Gustman, A. & Steinmeier, T. (1999). What people don’t know about their pensions and  
Social Security: An analysis using linked data from the health and retirement study. 
NBER Working Paper No. 7368. 
 
Hagy, A. P., & Staniec, J.F. O. (2002).Immigrant status, race, and institutional choice in higher 
education. Economics of Education Review, 21, 381-392.  
 
Hansen, J.S. (2008).  Teacher pensions: a background paper.  Washington, DC:  
 Committee for Economic Development. 
 
Hanushek, E. A. (1986). The Economies of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in  
 Public Schooling. Journal of Economic Literature, 24(3), 1141-1177. 
 
Harris, D.N. & Adams, S.J. (2007).Understanding the level and causes of teacher  
turnover: A comparison with other professions.  Economics of Education Review,  
26(3), 325-337. 
 
Ingersoll, R. (2001).  Teacher turnover and teacher shortages: An organizational analysis.   
American Educational Research Journal, 38(3), 499-534. 
 
Ippolito, R.A. (1985).  The labor contract and true economic pension liabilities. The  
American Economic Review, 75(5), 1031-1043. 
 
Ippolito, R.A. (1991).  Encouraging long-term tenure: wage tilt or pensions?  Industrial  
& Labor Relations Review, 44(3), 520-535. 
 
Ippolito, R.A. (1997).  Pension Plans and Employee Performance.  Chicago: University  
of Chicago Press. 
 
Johnson, R. (2002).  The puzzle of later male retirement. Economic Review - Federal  
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 87(3), 5-26.  
 
127 
 
Lazear, E.P. (1979). Why is there mandatory retirement? Journal of Political Economy, 
87(6),  1261-1284. 
 
Logue, D. (1979).  A theory of pensions.  In Legislative Influence on Corporate Pension  
Plans.  Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.  
 
Madrid-Davis, G. et al. Letter on GAO study, August 2, 2006.  Retrieved June 17 2008  
from  http://www.aft.org/topics/pensions/downloads/gao_letter.pdf 
 
Mathematica Policy Research Inc.  Evaluating the effectiveness of charter school  
management organizations.  Retrieved March 30, 2010 from http://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/education/cmo.asp 
 
Mermin G., Johnson R., & Murphy D. (2007). Why do boomers plan to work  
longer? The Journals of Gerontology. 62B(5), 86-94.  
 
Miller, J,  McKenna, B. & McKenna, M. (1998). A Comparison of alternatively and  
 traditionally prepared teachers. Journal of Teacher Education. 49 (3): 165-76. 
 
Mishel, L. & Rothstein, R. (2007).  False alarm.  Phi Delta Kappan, 88(10), 737-740. 
 
Mitchell, O.  (1982). Fringe Benefits and Labor Mobility. The Journal of Human  
Resources, 17(2), 286.  
 
Mitchell, O.  (1983). Fringe Benefits and the Cost of Changing Jobs. Industrial & Labor  
Relations Review, 37(1), 70.  
 
Mitchell, O. & Luzadis, R. (1988). Changes in pension incentives through time.  
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 42(1), 100-108. 
 
Mitchell, O. & Smith, R. (1994).  Pension funding in the public sector.  The Review  
of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), 278-290. 
 
Milanowski, A., & Odden, A. (2007). A new approach to the cost of teacher turnover 
(Working Paper No. 13). Seattle: University of Washington, School Finance Redesign 
Project, Center on Reinventing Public Education. 
 
Montgomery, E. & Shaw, K. (1997).  Pensions and wage premia.  Economic Inquiry,  
35(3), 510-533. 
 
Montgomery, E., Shaw, K. & Benedict, M.E. (1992).  Pensions and wages: an hedonic  
price theory approach.  International Economic Review, 33(1), 111-129. 
 
Morgan, D. (1996).  Focus Groups.  Annual Review of Sociology, 22, 129-152 
 
Mulvey, J. (2003). Retirement behavior and retirement plan designs: Strategies to retain  
128 
 
an aging workforce. Benefits Quarterly, 19(4), 25-35. 
 
National Education Association (2004). NEA Issue Brief on Pension Protections in State  
 Constitutions.  Retrieved June 16, 2008 from  
 http://www.nea.org/takenote/images/penprotect06.pdf 
 
National Education Association (2008). Characteristics of large public education pension  
plans. Washington, DC: NEA. 
 
National Education Association.  Saving our retirement security: the link between social  
security privatization and attacks on public education pension plans.  Retrieved June 16, 
2008 from http://www.nea.org/lac/socsec/cbmemo.html 
 
National Education Association.  Our History.  Retrieved September 20, 2010 from  
http://www.nea.org/home/1704.htm 
 
Ni, S., Podgursky, M. & Ehlert, M. (2009). Teacher retirement benefits and labor market  
behavior in Missouri. Paper presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives, 
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. 
 
Oakes, J. (1990).  Multiplying inequalities: The effects of race, social class, and tracking  
on opportunities to learn mathematics and science.  Santa Monica, CA: The Rand 
Corporation. 
 
Ordovensky, J. F. (1995). Effects of institutional attributes on enrollment choice:  
Implications for postsecondary vocational education. Economics of Education Review, 
14(4), 335-350. 
 
Pew Research Center (2010).  Millennials: A portrait of generation next. 
 
Podgursky, M. & Ehlert, M. (2007).  Teacher pensions and retirement behavior: how  
teacher pension rules affect behavior, mobility, and retirement.  AIR/NCES Teacher 
Supply and Demand Conference.  
 
Porter, S. R., & Umbach, P. D. (2006). College major choice: An analysis of person- 
environment fit. Research in Higher Education, 47(4), 429-449. 
 
Rockoff, J. (2004). The impact of individual teachers on student achievement: Evidence  
from panel data. American Economic Review, 94(2), 247-252. 
 
Rotherham, A.J. & Sullivan, M. (2006).  D.C.’s new teacher demographics.  Retrieved  
June 20, 2008 from  
http://www.educationsector.org/analysis/analysis_show.htm?doc_id=401267 
 
Samwick, A. (1998). New evidence on pensions, Social Security, and the timing of  
retirement. Journal of Public Economics 70(2), 207–236. 
129 
 
 
Schieber, S.J. (2007).  Tales of the Dodo Bird and the Yellowstone Wolf: lessons for DB  
pensions and the retirement ecosystem.  In Ghilarducci, T. & Weller, C.E. (Eds.)  
Employee Pensions: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities.  Champaign, IL: Labor  
and Employment Relations Association.   
 
Shust, D. & Moody, R. (2006). Letter to conferees on pension reform legislation.   
Retrieved June 16, 2008 from http://www.nea.org/lac/letters/306pension.html 
 
Shust, D. & Moody, R. (2006). Letter to the full congress on pension reform.   
Retrieved June 16, 2008 from http://www.nea.org/lac/letters/706pension.html 
 
Shust, D. & Moody, R. (2006). Letter to the U.S. Senate.  Retrieved June 16, 2008 from  
http://www.nea.org/lac/letters/806pension.html 
 
Social Security Administration (2010a).  SSA Publication No. 05-10035.  Retrieved April 8,  
2011 from http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10035.pdf 
 
Social Security Administration (2010b). Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2010.   
Retrieved April 8, 2011 from 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2010/fast_facts10.pdf 
 
StataCorp (2009) Stata Survey Data Reference Manual, Release 11. College Station, TX:  
StataCorp LP. 
 
Stock, J. &Wise, D. (1990a). Pensions, the option value of work, and retirement. 
Econometrica 58: 1151–80. 
 
Stock, J. & Wise, D. (1990b). The pension inducement to retire: An option value  
analysis. In Issues in the economics of aging, edited by David Wise, pp. 205–29. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Stratton, L. S., O'Toole, D. M., & Wetzela, J. N. (2008). A multinomial logit model of  
college stopout and dropout behavior. Economics of Education Review, 27(3), 319-331. 
 
Turner, J. (2010) Pension Policy: The Search for Better Solutions.  Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.  
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
 
U.S. Department of Education (2008). A commitment to quality: National Charter School  
Policy Forum report, Washington, D.C. 
 
Yahoo! HotJobs & Robert Half International (2007). What millennial workers want: How  
to attract and retain gen y employees.  Retrieved from  
http://www.hotjobsresources.com/pdfs/MillennialWorkers.pdf 
 
 
130 
 
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A- KEY FEATURES OF STATE RETIREMENT PLANS 
Information in this table was compiled from state websites and teacher retirement handbooks. 
Because different rules apply to teachers who entered the retirement systems at different    times, it 
is important to note that the figures below refer to current hires as of April 2010.  
 
State   Plan Type 
Years to 
Vest 
Teacher 
Contribution 
Employer 
Contribution 
Replacement 
Factor  
Eligible for Full 
Retirement 
AL DB   10 5% 8.17%* 2.0125 25 yrs or age 60 + 10 yrs 
AK 
DB or DC 
(District 
choice) 
8, 5 
(stepped) 
8.65% (DB) 8% 
(DC) 
22% (DB) 5% 
(DC) 
2 (first 20 years), 
2.5 (21+) 20 yrs 
AZ DB 5 9.6% 9.60% 2.1-2.3 (by yrs of svc) 
Age 65 or 62 w/10 yrs or 
Rule of 80 
AR DB 5 6% 14% 2.15 Age 60 or 28 years  
CA DB 5 8% 4.50% 1.15-2.4 (by age)  Age 55 or 50 w/30 years 
CO Choice of DB or DC 5 8% 
13.85% (DB) 
10.15% (DC) 2.5 Age 65 or 50 w/30 years 
CT DB 10 7.25% 15.28%* 2 35 years or age 60 w/20 years 
DE DB 5 3% 7.44% 1.85 Age 62 w/5 yrs, 60 w/15 years, or 30 yrs 
DC DB 5 8% N/A* 1.5-2 (by yrs of svc up to 10) 
30 yrs or age 60 w/20 
years  
FL DB 6 N/A 9.85% 1.6-1.68 (by age and svc) Age 62 30 yrs  
GA DB 10 5.25% 9.74% 2 30 yrs or age 60 w/10 years 
HI DB 5 6% 15% 2 Age 55 w/30 yrs, age 62 w/5 yrs 
ID DB 5 6.23% 10.39% 2 Age 65 or Rule of 90 
IL DB 5 9.40% 7.64%* 2.2 Age 62 or Rule of 90 
IN 
DB (Plus 
mandatory 
3% DC) 
10 5% 13.22%* 1.1 Age 65 w/10 yrs or rule of 85 
IA DB 4 4.50% 6.95% N/A Age 65 or Rule of 88 
KS DB 5 6% 5.75%* 1.75 Age 65 or Rule of 90 
KY DB 5 9.86% 13.11% 2.5 27 yrs or age 60 
LA DB 5 8% 15.50% 2.5 20 yrs at age 65 or 30 yrs 
ME DB 5 7.65% 17.78% 2 Age 62 or 25 yrs 
MD DB 5 5% 11.17%* 1.8 Age 62 or 30 yrs 
MA DB 5 11% N/A* Up to 2.5, 30 yrs 
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depending on age 
MI DB 10 6.40% 7.6%* 1.5 30 yrs or age 60 
MN DB 3 9% 9.50% 1.2-1.9 (by yrs of svc)    
Age 65 or 62 w/30 yrs or 
Rule of 90 
MS DB 8 7.25% 11.3%* 2 (up to 25 yrs), 2.5 (26+) Age 60 or 25 yrs 
MO DB 5 13.50% 13.50% 2.5 (up to 30 yrs), 2.55 (30+)  
Age 60 or 30 yrs or Rule 
of 80 
MT DB 5 7.15% 7.58%* 1.6667 Age 60 or 25 yrs 
NE DB 5 8.28% 8.29% 2 65 or Rule of 85 
NV DB 5 N/A 21.50% 2.67 Age 65 or 30 yrs 
NH DB 10 6.57% 2.81% N/A   Age 60 
NJ DB 10 5.50% 1%* N/A Age 62 
NM DB 5 7.90% 13.90% 2.35 Age 65 or 25 yrs or Rule of 75 
NY DB 10 3.50% 8.62% 1.67 (first 25 yrs), 2(26+) Age 55 w/10 years  
NC DB 5 6% 8.14% 1.82 Age 65 or 30 yrs 
ND DB 5 7.75% 8.75% 2 Rule of 90 
OH 
Choice of 
DB, DC, 
or Hybrid 
 10% 14% (DB) 10.5% (DC) 2.2 (DB), 1(Hybrid) 
Age 65 or 30 yrs (DB) 50 
(DC) 
OK DB 5 7% 9% 2 Rule of 90 
OR Hybrid 5 6% 16.97%* 1.5 Age 65 or 30 yrs 
PA DB 5 6.25% 8% 2 Age 60 or 35 yrs 
RI DB 10 9.50% 14.84%* 1.6-2.5, based on yrs of svc Age 65 or 29 yrs 
SC Choice of DB or DC 5 6.50% 9.25% 1.82 28 yrs  
SD DB 3 6% 6% 1.55 Age 65 
TN DB 5 5% 6.13%* 1.5 (up to 50k), 2.5(over 50k) Age 60 or 30 yrs  
TX DB 5 6.40% 6.40% 2.3 Age 65 or Rule of 80 
UT DB  N/A  2 Age 65 or 30 yrs 
VT DB 5 3.54% 4.81%* 1.67 Age 62 or 30 yrs 
VA DB 5 5% 6.62%* 1.7 Age 65 or 30 yrs 
WA 
Choice of 
DB or 
Hybrid  
5 3.36% (DB), 5-15% (Hybrid) 1.37%* 2 (DB), 1 (Hybrid) Age 65 
WV DB and/or DC 12 
6% (DB) 4.5% 
(DC) 
25.6% (DB) 6% 
(DC) 2 Age 60 or 35 yrs 
WI DB 5 6.20% 4.80% 1.6 Age 65 or 30 yrs 
WY DB 4 5.57% 5.68% 2.125 (first 15 yrs), 2.25 (16+) Age 60 or Rule of 85 
* Imputed  from Hansen (2008) for states that did not have current employer contribution  
          information available on their website or in their retirement handbook.  
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APPENDIX B- QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUPS 
 
FOR CURRENT TEACHERS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
 
Knowledge/Opinions on Current Plan 
Tell me about your retirement plan. 
How did you find out about your retirement plan? 
Do you feel well-informed about your retirement plan? 
Who would you go to if you had questions about your retirement plan? 
What do you like about your retirement plan?  What do you dislike?   
What would you change if you could? 
Do you feel your retirement plan is fair?  Why or why not? 
Is retirement something you thought about when choosing a career? 
At what age do you think you will retire?  Will you teach until then?   
 
***Show video about retirement plans*** 
 
Opinions on Retirement Plan Alternatives 
After watching the video, would you prefer a different retirement plan than the one you have now?  
Why or why not? 
What do you like about defined benefit plans?  What do you dislike? 
What do you like about defined contribution plans?  What do you dislike? 
Would you prefer a mix of both plans?  Why or why not? 
Do you think the other teachers at your school would agree with your preferences?   
Should individual teachers have a choice of retirement plans?  Why or why not? 
 
 
FOR FUTURE TEACHERS 
 
Knowledge/Opinions on Current Plan 
What do you know about teacher retirement plans? 
How did you obtain that information? 
Is retirement something you think about when choosing a career? 
At what age do you think you will retire?  Will you teach until then?   
 
***Show video about retirement plans*** 
 
Opinions on Retirement Plan Alternatives 
After watching the video, which retirement plan would you prefer? 
What do you like about defined benefit plans?  What do you dislike? 
What do you like about defined contribution plans?  What do you dislike? 
Would you prefer a mix of both plans?  Why or why not? 
Do you think other teachers or future teachers you know would agree with your preferences?   
Should individual teachers have a choice of retirement plans?  Why or why not? 
 
 
